The application of natural language processing to open source intelligence for ontology development in the advanced persistent threat domain by Holzer, Corey T
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
12-2016
The application of natural language processing to
open source intelligence for ontology development
in the advanced persistent threat domain
Corey T. Holzer
Purdue University
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Recommended Citation
Holzer, Corey T., "The application of natural language processing to open source intelligence for ontology development in the
advanced persistent threat domain" (2016). Open Access Dissertations. 948.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/948
  
THE APPLICATION OF NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING TO 
OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE FOR ONTOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT 
DOMAIN 
by 




Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of 
 




Department of Technology 






THE PURDUE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL 
STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL 
Dr. J. Eric Dietz, Chair 
Department of Computer and Information Technology 
Dr. Biajian Yang 
Department of Computer and Information Technology 
Dr. Dongyan Xu 
Department of Computer Science 
Dr. John A. Springer 
Department of Computer and Information Technology 
 
Approved by: 
Dr. Kathryne A. Newton 






This work is dedicated to my wife, Rachael, and our children who selflessly support me in 





There are several people that I would like to acknowledge for their support of this 
endeavor. 
My wife, Rachael, who has shown me unwavering support for the 23 years that 
we have been together. I could never have accomplished what I have without her. I also 
want to thank my children Christina, Gwendolyn, Alannah, Joshua and Destini. Their 
faith in and love for me is a constant source of strength each and every day. 
My Committee Chair, Dr. Eric Dietz for his guidance and mentorship throughout 
my dissertation and as my advisor while attending Purdue. My committee Dr. Yang, Dr. 
Xu, and Dr. Springer for their insights and guidance throughout the dissertation process. 
My thanks to Dr. Eugene "Spaf" Spafford, Director Emeritus of the CERIAS Program, 
because without his urging and guidance I might not have had this opportunity in the first 
place. To Mrs. Marlene Walls whose help and guidance through the administrative 
aspects of graduate life at Purdue saved me many hours of work and needlessly running 
around campus. 
I want to acknowledge U.S. Army Cyber Command for selecting me as one of 
their FY15 Army Cyber Scholars. They saw in me the potential as a Cyber leader for the 
Army and demonstrated their confidence in that potential by selecting me. What I have 
accomplished over the last two years demonstrates that their confidence was well 
founded. 
I wish to acknowledge Colonel Timothy Frambes, Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. 
(Dean) Smith, and Tommie L. Walker, Lieutenant Colonel (USA Retired) whose 
mentorship and leadership has been invaluable. I continually seek to emulate and 
incorporate their leadership styles into my own. I also want to thank James Lerums 
Colonel (USA Retired), Major Patrick Glass, and Captain Chris Baker fellow students 
and colleagues in military life. You were always there willing to give me the azimuth 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. x 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xi 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ xii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ xiii 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Background ......................................................................................................................... 2 
Scope ................................................................................................................................... 2 
Significance......................................................................................................................... 3 
Statement of Purpose .......................................................................................................... 3 
Assumptions ........................................................................................................................ 3 
Limitations .......................................................................................................................... 3 
Delimitations ....................................................................................................................... 4 
Summary ............................................................................................................................. 4 
Review of Relevant Literature ............................................................................................ 5 
Defining Advanced Persistent Threats................................................................................ 5 
APT as an Attack ........................................................................................................ 6 
APT as an Organization .............................................................................................. 6 
Phases of the APT Attack ................................................................................................... 7 
Reconnaissance ........................................................................................................... 7 
Weaponization ............................................................................................................ 8 
Delivery ....................................................................................................................... 8 
Exploitation ................................................................................................................. 8 
Installation ................................................................................................................... 8 
Command and Control ................................................................................................ 9 
Actions on Objective ................................................................................................... 9 
History of APTs ................................................................................................................ 10 
Shady Rat .................................................................................................................. 10 




Poison Ivy Attack on RSA ........................................................................................ 11 
Icefog ........................................................................................................................ 11 
Stuxnet ...................................................................................................................... 12 
GhostNet/Shadows in the Cloud ............................................................................... 12 
New York Times Attack ........................................................................................... 13 
Trojan.APT.Seinup ................................................................................................... 14 
The Cost of the APT Threat ...................................................................................... 14 
Understanding the Challenge of Detecting APTs ............................................................. 15 
Challenges Specific to APT Detection...................................................................... 15 
Anti-detection Methods Employed with Malware .................................................... 15 
Anti-emulation ...................................................................................................... 16 
Anti-online ............................................................................................................ 16 
Anti-Analysis ........................................................................................................ 16 
Anti-hardware ....................................................................................................... 16 
Anti-debugger, Anti-disassembler, and Anti-Tools .............................................. 16 
Anti-memory ......................................................................................................... 17 
Anti-process .......................................................................................................... 17 
Packers and Protectors .......................................................................................... 17 
Metamorphic or Polymorphic ............................................................................... 17 
Defining and Evaluating Open Source Intelligence .................................................. 17 
The Science of Natural Language Processing .......................................................... 18 
Defining NLP and Key Terms .............................................................................. 18 
Examples of NLP in the Public Domain ............................................................... 20 
IBM’s Watson ................................................................................................... 21 
Stanford’s CoreNLP.......................................................................................... 21 
BookNLP .......................................................................................................... 22 
Natural Language Toolkit ................................................................................. 22 
How NLP Processes Human Language ................................................................ 22 
The Role of Ontology ............................................................................................... 23 
Ontology Basics .................................................................................................... 24 




Prior Related Research .............................................................................................. 25 
Mundie and McIntire ............................................................................................ 25 
Huang, Loia, and Kao ........................................................................................... 26 
Meckl, Tecuci, Boicu, and Marcu ......................................................................... 26 
Lundquist, Zhang, and Ouksel .............................................................................. 27 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 27 
Framework and Methodology ........................................................................................... 28 
Framework ........................................................................................................................ 28 
Researcher Bias ................................................................................................................. 28 
Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 28 
Data Collection ................................................................................................................. 30 
Analysis............................................................................................................................. 31 
Credibility ......................................................................................................................... 32 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 32 
Research and Analysis ...................................................................................................... 33 
Building the Corpus .......................................................................................................... 33 
Building the Initial Training Lexicon ............................................................................... 34 
Processing Documents through BookNLP ....................................................................... 34 
Errors with NLP Output ............................................................................................ 35 
Unhandled Exception ............................................................................................ 35 
Import File Error – Non-ASCII Character ............................................................ 36 
Import File Error – Quotation Marks .................................................................... 37 
Escaping Characters .............................................................................................. 37 
Examining the Documents in the Corpus ......................................................................... 37 
Understanding the Tokens ........................................................................................ 38 
Examining the Corpus Tokens .................................................................................. 39 
Removing Common Words from the Data ............................................................... 41 
Using Lemma ............................................................................................................ 41 
Discrepancy between Variation and Lemma Counts ............................................ 42 
Multiple Lemma for One Variation ...................................................................... 43 




NER Misidentification .......................................................................................... 45 
Multi-Token NER Issue ........................................................................................ 45 
Building the Ontology....................................................................................................... 46 
Selecting Terms for the Ontology ............................................................................. 46 
Statistical Analyses that were Applied ................................................................. 46 
Statistical Analyses that were Rejected ................................................................ 48 
How Analyses were Applied ................................................................................ 50 
Building the Ontology Structure ............................................................................... 50 
Classifying and Categorizing Terms ..................................................................... 50 
Class .................................................................................................................. 50 
Individual .......................................................................................................... 51 
Property ............................................................................................................. 51 
Organizing the Ontology....................................................................................... 52 
Building the Draft Ontology ............................................................................. 52 
Basic Structure .................................................................................................. 54 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 55 
Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................. 56 
Summary of Study ............................................................................................................ 56 
Purpose of Study ....................................................................................................... 56 
Significance of Study ................................................................................................ 57 
Methodology Review ................................................................................................ 57 
Learning Curve ..................................................................................................... 58 
Software Challenges ............................................................................................. 58 
Recommendations for Future Research ............................................................................ 59 
Expand the Ontology ................................................................................................ 60 
Incorporate Other Related Ontologies .................................................................. 60 
Apply the Ontology for Further Ontology Development ..................................... 60 
Improve Knowledge through Link Analysis ............................................................. 61 
The Role of Link Analysis .................................................................................... 61 
Measuring Knowledge .......................................................................................... 63 




Human Resources Accounting (HRA) ................................................................................... 63 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) .......................................................................................................... 64 
Intellectual Capital (IC) ............................................................................................................... 65 
Economic Value Added™ (EVA™) ............................................................................................ 65 
Recommended Solution for Measuring APT Knowledge ................................ 66 
Basic Scoring Approach............................................................................................................... 67 
Weighted Scoring Approach...................................................................................................... 67 
Apply the Ontology to Support Cyber Resiliency .................................................... 67 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 68 
References ......................................................................................................................... 69 
Appendix A. Corpus Statistics .......................................................................................... 78 
Appendix B. Five Hundred (500) Most Common Tokens ............................................... 96 
Appendix C. Sample of the Ontology ............................................................................. 113 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: NER Classifications ............................................................................................ 20 
Table 2: Capture as an example lemma ............................................................................ 20 
Table 3: Quantiles for All Tokens in the Corpus .............................................................. 40 
Table 4: Quantiles for All Words in the Corpus ............................................................... 40 
Table 5: 10 Most Common words in Contemporary American English .......................... 41 
Table 6: Sample Lemma ................................................................................................... 42 
Table 7: Sample of One Variation with Two or More Lemmas ....................................... 43 
Table 8: NER Classifications ............................................................................................ 44 
Table 9: Top 15 Tokens (by Various Factors) .................................................................. 48 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Visual Representation of Coreference (Stanford NLP Group, n.d.-a) .............. 19 
Figure 2: Visual Representation of NER (Stanford NLP Group, n.d.-a) .......................... 19 
Figure 3: Watson structures Natural Language Resources within a domain (International 
Business Machines, n.d.). ................................................................................................. 21 
Figure 4: Example of the Vertical and Horizontal Aspects of an Ontology ..................... 24 
Figure 5: Methodology Workflow .................................................................................... 29 
Figure 6: “Unhandled Exception” Error ........................................................................... 35 
Figure 7: Sample character that createsd import issues .................................................... 35 
Figure 8: “Import Error” Issue .......................................................................................... 36 
Figure 9: “File Not Loaded Properly” Message ............................................................... 36 
Figure 10: Quotation Marks Example............................................................................... 37 
Figure 11: Sample of Document Tokens .......................................................................... 38 
Figure 12: Distribution of Tokens (by Document) ........................................................... 39 
Figure 13: NER Classification Breakdown....................................................................... 45 
Figure 14: Sample of URLs Misidentified as Dates ......................................................... 45 
Figure 15: Representation off appearance Count as a Percentage of the Entire Corpus .. 49 
Figure 16: Appearance Ratio for All Tokens in the Corpus ............................................. 49 
Figure 17: MySQL Database of Ontology Structure ........................................................ 53 
Figure 18: An example of a Class when viewed as a MySQL database table .................. 53 
Figure 19: The class-subclass structure in Protégé ........................................................... 54 
Figure 20: Nesting of Classes ........................................................................................... 55 






LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
APT Advanced Persistent Threat 
C2 Command and Control 
CND Computer Network Defense 
CNE Computer Network Exploitation 
CoCA Corpus of Contemporary American English 
CSS Creative Style Sheets 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
GREAT Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
NCHC National Center for High Performance and Computing 
IMF Information Warfare Monitor 
NER Named Entity Recognition 
NLP Natural Language Processing 
OSINT Open Source Intelligence 
OWL Ontology Language 
OWL2 W3C’s Ontology Language 2.0 
PoS Parts of Speech 
RAT Remote Access Toolkit 
SaaS Software as a Service 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SCP Secure Copy Protocol 
SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol 
SIEM Security Information and Event Management 
SSH Secure Shell 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
VPN Virtual Private Network 






Author: Holzer, Corey, T. Ph.D. 
Institution: Purdue University 
Degree Received: December 2016 
Title: The Application of Natural Language Processing to Open Source Intelligence for 
Ontology Development in the APT Domain  
Major Professor: J. Eric Dietz. 
 
Over the past decade, the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) has risen to forefront 
of cybersecurity threats. APTs are a major contributor to the billions of dollars lost by 
corporations around the world annually. The threat is significant enough that the Navy 
Cyber Power 2020 plan identified them as a “must mitigate” threat in order to ensure the 
security of its warfighting network. 
Reports, white papers, and various other open source materials offer a plethora of 
information to cybersecurity professionals regarding these APT attacks and the 
organizations behind them but mining and correlating information out of these various 
sources needs the support of standardized language and a common understand of terms 
that comes from an accepted APT ontology. 
This paper and its related research applies the science of Natural Language 
Processing Open Source Intelligence in order to build an open source Ontology in the 








Sophisticated hackers today employ complex operations in order to achieve their 
goals. They use intelligence gathering techniques to collect information about a potential 
target. They study these target networks and organizations to find weaknesses that they 
can use to their advantage. They execute attacks in a precise and careful manner in order 
to remain hidden from their targets. These attacks can even go dormant for months at a 
time or be executed over an extended period so as not to trip standard cybersecurity 
measures employed by their victims. 
Conversely, intelligence about potential threats aids cybersecurity professionals in 
the defense of their networks as well. Like military forces on the battlefield these 
professionals need knowledge about those attacking their network and the means of 
attack that these adversaries employ in order for these professionals to better defend their 
network. 
The rise in frequency and complexity of cyberattacks means that cybersecurity 
professionals are fighting a pitched battle and the intelligence they have is their best 
means of dealing with the threats that infiltrate their network and remain hidden within it 
in order to steal data or to do harm. Over the last decade these complex attacks known 
collectively as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) presented some of the greatest 
challenges to network and national security as the perpetrators executed these attacks 
against both the private and public sector. 
This paper represents the author’s research into the development of an APT 
ontology through the mining of open source intelligence. By employing the science of 
Natural Language Processing, it is the goal of this research to build a useful tool which 
will enable cybersecurity professionals to learn about these attacks  
This chapter breaks down into seven sections. The first provides a brief 
background regarding APTs over the last decade. The second addresses the scope of the 
research. The third section lays out the significance of the research. The fourth provides 
the Statement of Purpose for the research. The final three sections outline the 





Nearly one decade ago the term APT was coined. It described an emerging and 
complex form of cyberattacks that were engineered to steal data over an extended period 
of time while evading detection through a variety of techniques including small data 
transfers, use of non-malicious applications for malicious ends, etc. (Brill, 2010). These 
attackers were not seeking to do drastic or violent harm to an infected network. Instead 
they laid in wait eavesdropping on the network waiting for the right opportunity to 
present itself. 
In his seminal work on APTs, Eric Cole likened these attackers and their attack to 
shoplifters. Cole notes, “At the point of entry the legitimate customer and shoplifter look 
identical. … If that shoplifter is only in the store for 5 min[sic], the store has less than 5 
min to detect and deal with the problem (Cole, 2012, p. 7).” To carry his analogy one step 
farther, if the shoplifter browses around the store doing little to cause suspicion and 
waiting for an ideal time (i.e. when the store owner is busy with a lunchtime crowd) to 
pilfer the item he desires the shop owner or the shop workers may never be any the wiser. 
According to a market research report in 2015, the APT protection market 
generated $3.9B USD in 2015 (PR Newswire, 2015). The figure is based on expenditures 
on items including Sandboxing, Endpoint Protection, Forensic Analysis, Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM), Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), 
Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS), Firewalls, etc. (PR Newswire, 2015). The same report 
by MarketsandMarkets estimated that this expenditure would more than double to $8.7B 
USD in 2020 (PR Newswire, 2015).  The cost of APT attacks will be discussed in greater 
depth in Chapter 2. 
Scope 
The research focused on the development of an ontology in the APT domain. This 
effort will not attempt to create new signatures or update existing signatures nor will it 
test to see if modified signatures can improve detection. For the reasons of timeframe and 
skillset, such an effort is beyond what the researcher would be able to complete to satisfy 





In a world where so much of our commerce, infrastructure, and even national 
defense depends on the communication pathways provided by the internet, failure to 
detect and mitigate the threat represented by APTs could impact businesses, civilian 
infrastructure, and potentially national security of all nations. Current Cyber Network 
Defense measures are unable to reliably and regularly detect APTs that compromise both 
commercial and government networks. Part of the problem is incomplete understanding 
of these APTs and to see the various components of a single APT attack as parts of the 
larger whole. 
The goal of this research is to build a comprehensive ontology based on 
information resources found in the open source domain. This work uses both open source 
intelligence and open source tools in the fields of natural language processing and 
ontology development.  
Statement of Purpose 
Upon its conclusion, this research will produce an ontology, built to OWL2 
specifications in Protégé, for use in the APT culled from Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) resources found in the public domain of the World Wide Web. 
Assumptions 
The design of this study is based upon the following assumptions: 
 An APT domain ontology does not already exist in the public domain. 
 The pool of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is significantly large enough 
to create a useful ontology pertaining to the APT domain. 
Limitations 
The design of this research incorporates the following limitations: 
 OSINT – The pool of information used for this research will be limited to 
what information about APTs exists in the public domain. 




 Skillset – While I have some programing experience it is not significant 
enough nor do I possess the expertise in malware forensics needed to properly 
develop signatures for use by existing cybersecurity systems to detect and/or 
mitigate an APT attack. 
Delimitations 
Factors outside of the control of the researcher creates the following 
delimitations: 
 Time – The Army has afforded the author a finite amount of time, two (2) 
years, to complete all the requirements of a graduate degree. 
 Machine Processing - The identification of ontological terms will be 
performed by software. Therefore, the amount of data that can be processed 
will be limited by how much data can be obtained and by the processing 
power of the systems being employed. 
 Open Source Intelligence – What information about APTs is available in the 
public domain is limited both by what cybersecurity companies wish to keep 
proprietary and what governments identify as classified information. 
 Exclusion of other OSINT – Limited assets for scanning and limited time for 
manually processing non-digital OSINT means that the research must exclude 
non-digital OSINT. 
Summary 
In this chapter, you were provided with an overview of rise of the APT over the 
past decade as well as the projected growing costs of protecting systems and networks 
from these attacks over the next 5 years. We reviewed the significance of the research 
and the deliverables this researcher expects to provide upon completion. Finally, it 
addressed assumptions, limitations, and delimitations impacting the project at hand. The 





REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
With the overview of the research complete, we will now move into a review of 
the relevant existing literature. This chapter covers eight areas of literature relevant to the 
current research effort. The first three sections provide context for the Advanced 
Persistent Threat by defining APTs, examining the APT attack in detail, and through an 
exploration of the decade long history of APT attacks and the costs associated with them. 
The fourth section defines the present challenges of detecting APT attacks as well as 
exploring the countermeasures used by malicious individuals in order to evade detection. 
The last four sections examine concepts, disciplines, and related research in the 
APT domain which is relevant to this research. The first addresses the concept of Open 
Source Intelligence. The second explores the science of Natural Language Processing. 
The last defines ontologies. This chapter concludes with an exploration of research in the 
field of Advanced Persistent Threats, with particular focus on the development of APT 
ontologies. 
Defining Advanced Persistent Threats 
The United States Air Force first coined the phrase Advanced Persistent Threat in 
2006 (Arsene, 2015; Ask et al., 2013; Bejtlich, n.d.). They created the term in order to 
facilitate discussions about the characteristics, activities involved, and the classification 
of these types of attacks (Ask et al., 2013). 
It is proper to begin this research endeavor by defining how Advanced Persistent 
Threat will be used for our purposes. The threat is Advanced in that adversaries can 
employ tactics that cover the full spectrum of cyber-attacks (Ask et al., 2013; Bejtlich, 
n.d.; Bodeau, Graubart, Heinbockel, & Laderman, 2014; Cole, 2012). It is Persistent in 
that he is not an opportunistic hacker searching for easily infiltrated systems (Bejtlich, 
n.d.). Instead, the persistent attack is one that will operates over an extended period of 
time with a pre-determined target and desired end state for the cyber-attack (Bejtlich, 




APT as an Attack 
The APT attack involves multiple methods, tools, and techniques used in a 
sophisticated complex manner in order to compromise the target and achieve what is 
usually a long-term objective (Chandran, P, & Poornachandran, 2015; ISACA, n.d.-a). 
The attacks are referred to as complex because they involve multiple forms of attack in 
order to compromise a target. A single APT can include a combination of social 
engineering of human targets, a phishing campaign as a call to action by a victim, and the 
use of malware to gain access and elevated permissions on target systems (Ask et al., 
2013; ISACA, n.d.-b, n.d.-c). 
The actual phases of an APT attack will be discussed in a later section. The 
discussion will follow the framework outlined by Lockheed Martin in its Cyber Kill 
Chain (Ask et al., 2013). It is important to note that as the APT attack phases should not 
be considered as discrete events where one phase ends and the next begins (Chandran et 
al., 2015). Keep in mind that there can be overlap as the attack propagates across the 
target network. It is also important to understand that while we use the term persistent it 
is not intended to mean that the attack is constantly active or that connections between 
the APTs’ C2 server and compromised hosts is constant (Ask et al., 2013; Hutchins, 
Cloppert, & Amin, 2011; Raj, Chezhian, & Mrithulashri, 2014). 
The sophistication and complexity of APT attacks make it hard for organizations 
to recognize one particular element as being only one piece of a larger plan (Armerding, 
2012; Ask et al., 2013). In this game of cat and mouse the attacker has the advantage of 
having unlimited time, resources, the victim organization’s prioritization of its business 
processes, and less fear of prosecution when the attack takes place across international 
borders (Auty, 2015). 
APT as an Organization 
In addition to describing the attack, the term APT is used to describe the 
organizations that execute these attacks. In this context the discussion focuses on 
organizations that are well funded, well organized, and patient (Cole, 2012). They can 




exfiltrate (Bodeau et al., 2014). Their goal is stealthy execution instead of the kind of 
attack that draws attention to the person or persons committing the crime. 
While it is understood that those responsible for APT attacks are well organized 
and that they possess significant funds, cybersecurity professionals must not confuse this 
with meaning that they are sponsored by state actors (Ask et al., 2013). Cybersecurity 
professionals attribute some APTs to state sponsored actors but state sponsorship in not a 
required component of the definition (Bejtlich, 2013; Mandiant, 2013). With APT 
defined let us explore the costs, both in financial and national security terms, associated 
with the threat. 
Phases of the APT Attack 
With the definitions complete, let us delve into the several phases that an APT 
attack employs in order to obtain the attacker’s desired end state. One of the more widely 
accepted description of the APT Attack comes from Lockheed Martin. The “Lockheed 
Martin Cyber Kill Chain” breaks the attack into seven phases. We will use their model as 







 Command and Control 
 Actions on Objective 
Additionally, the descriptions will include elements that other cybersecurity 
professionals and professional organizations include when discussing the APT attack. 
Reconnaissance 
Reconnaissance is the selection and identification of the desired target. In this 
stage the APT is footprinting the target organization and collecting information including 




systems, etc. (Hutchins et al., 2011). Through this information gathering process the APT 
determines who has ownership of the desired information that they seek to steal (2013). 
The APT will determine which employee to compromise as well as a potential means for 
doing so. 
Weaponization 
In the Weaponization phase, the APT puts together the code that they will use to 
compromise a target system (Hutchins et al., 2011). This will often involve the use of 
existing and proven code but, if needed, APTs will adapt or modify code in order to 
address a specific configuration or defensive challenge (Ask et al., 2013; Cole, 2012; 
Hutchins et al., 2011). When using code designed for the specific target, the code has no 
anti-virus signature which the target company might use to detect it (Websense, 2011). 
Delivery 
In the Delivery phase, the APT transmits the weapon to the targeted system 
(Hutchins et al., 2011). Lockheed Martin identifies the most common delivery methods 
as email attachments, websites and removable media. In addition to those three, Ask, 
et.al. (Ask et al., 2013) identified social media as another means for launching at attack 
against an individual within the target organization. For the attack to move beyond this 
phase, the targeted individual most click on the link, attachment, or application for the 
attack to move into the next phase (Auty, 2015). 
Exploitation 
Exploitation involves compromising the host machine on the network. It is where 
the weaponized tool is triggered (Hutchins et al., 2011). The exploitation can be of a flaw 
in the operating system or an individual application on the host (Ask et al., 2013; 
Hutchins et al., 2011). 
Installation 
The next phase of the attack is the Installation phase. Installation refers to the 




gain control of the target’s computer (Ask et al., 2013; Hutchins et al., 2011). Once the 
victim triggers the malicious code (e.g. by clicking the malicious link, opening the 
infected file, or visiting the compromised site, etc.) the code reaches back to its 
Command and Control (C2) server and provides the attacker with useful information 
about the target network’s environment that could be useful in executing the later stages 
of the APT attack (Ask et al., 2013). Once installed the RAT can also lay dormant until 
the C2 server connects to it (Ask et al., 2013; Sikorski & Honig, 2012). 
Command and Control 
The Command and Control phase begins once the infected host beacons the C2 
server (Hutchins et al., 2011). Attackers need to maintain access to the victim’s network 
means that each communication with a compromised system (Auty, 2015). During this 
phase the APT will seek to obtain elevated privileges on the system and will install 
additional software to facilitate the attack (i.e., encryption) on compromised system and 
network (Ask et al., 2013). While the initial installation is achieved by software designed 
to exploit a zero-day vulnerability, the additional software is likely to be commonly 
known software that may even be approved to operate on the network for legitimate 
activities (e.g., SSH, SecureFTP, etc.) (Ask et al., 2013). 
Actions on Objective 
The final stage in Lockheed Martin’s APT Kill Chain is the Actions on Objective 
phase. During this phase the APT is actively going after the data that they originally 
identified as their target (Hutchins et al., 2011). The APT uses previously installed 
software to determine the network layout including, but not limited to, mapping the hosts 
of networked drives, database servers, domain controllers, PKI, etc. (Ask et al., 2013). 
The goal here is to footprint the network and to establish a network account and elevate 
the privileges for that account (Ask et al., 2013). During this phase, the APT will also 
seek to compromise more hosts in order to strengthen its foothold in the target network. 
The extraction of the target data may also be accomplished using custom encryption 





Conventionally, malware will remove itself once its task is complete or it is 
discovered and removed by antivirus software (Ask et al., 2013). The APT, however, is 
designed to stay invisible. It maintains persistence by reaching back to the C2 server for 
updates to the malicious code (Ask et al., 2013). Changing code enables the APT attack 
to avoid detection. Mandiant’s APT Attack model includes cleanup as part of this phase 
(Mandiant, 2013; Saarinen, 2013). However, it is more likely that the APT will leave 
some software in place in order to facilitate quicker access if the adversaries wish to 
exfiltrate more information in the future. The security firm Mandiant has data 
demonstrating that a group identified as APT1 has left software in place to re-access a 
target network months, and even years, later (Bejtlich, 2013; Mandiant, 2013; Raj et al., 
2014). 
History of APTs 
With an understanding of the APT attack established, we will next look at some 
examples of cyber-attacks that were qualified as APTs. By no means is this intended to 
be an all-inclusive list. It is intended to demonstrate the variety of attack elements and the 
variety of targets. 
Shady Rat 
With earliest evidence indicating that this APT collected data in mid-2006, it is 
possible that it was stealing data even earlier than the logs provide (Alperovitch, 2011). 
Evidence collected by McAfee indicates that, unlike other APTs discussed here, this APT 
was used against a wide range of individuals and organizations in multiple industries. 
Initial installation took place via a spear-phishing email. The attachment triggered the 
download and installation of malware that, in turn, created a backdoor communication 
channel with its C2 server. In four  of 71 instances where Shady RAT gained control of a 
target system, it remained persistent for 24 or more months (Alperovitch, 2011). 
Night Dragon 
This attack targeted the Global Energy Business Community (McAfee, 2011). 




attacks to exploit vulnerabilities and compromise Microsoft Active Directory machines. 
The initial targets were extranet web servers and then internal desktops and servers to 
gain elevated permissions within the hosts and target network. Finally, the APT harvested 
sensitive proprietary and project-financing related information sending that information 
back to C2 servers on the Internet (McAfee, 2011). 
Poison Ivy Attack on RSA 
The APT identified two specific independent groups of RSA employees and 
crafted a spear-phishing campaign tailored to the target employees’ job functions (RSA 
FraudAction Research Labs, 2011). The email contained a spreadsheet which executed 
code that leveraged an Adobe Flash vulnerability in order to inject a Poison Ivy RAT 
which, in turn, established a hard to connect reverse connection to the APT’s C2 servers. 
The data stolen included RSA’s SecureID two-factor authentication products (Ashford, 
2011). Executive Chairman Art Coviello issued an open letter to customers in which he 
acknowledged that the stolen information “could potentially be used to reduce the 
effectiveness of a current two-factor authentication implementation as part of a broader 
attack (Ashford, 2011; Coviello, n.d.).” 
Icefog 
This APT attack has been used numerous times starting in 2011 with most of the 
attacks targeting organizations in Japan and South Korea (Kaspersky Lab Global 
Research and Analysis Team, 2013). Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team 
(GREAT) researched the attacks and determined that their targets were supply chains of 
“government institutions, military contractors, maritime and ship-building groups, 
telecom operators, satellite operators, industrial and high technology companies and mass 
media (Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team, 2013).” 
The APT achieved their initial insertion through spear-phishing campaigns and 
attachments which exploited known vulnerabilities in the host’s operating system 
(Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team, 2013). GREAT identified at least 6 




and Analysis Team, 2013). They are as follows (with designations established by 
GREAT) (Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team, 2013): 
 The “old” 2011 Icefog — sends stolen data by e-mail 
 Type “1” “normal” Icefog — interacts with C2 servers 
 Type “2” Icefog — interacts with a script-based proxy server that redirects 
attacker commands 
 Type “3” Icefog — observed to use a certain kind of C2 via a different means 
of communication 
 Type “4” Icefog — another C2 variation with a different means of 
communication 
 Icefog-NG — communicates by direct TCP connection to port 5600 
Stuxnet 
In 2010 this worm was weaponized with the specific goal of impacting systems 
that run Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) engineered by Siemens 
(Kushner, 2013). The worm was initially uploaded via USB to a Windows workstation 
and started spreading across the target network without impacting any systems that did 
not run the SCADA software. Once it entered a machine where the SCADA was present 
it would connect with its C2 server and receive software updates (Kushner, 2013). The 
worm then compromised the system and began gathering information in order to get the 
elevated permissions needed to take control of centrifuges making them fail. The 
software would also provide false information back to the user giving the appearance that 
everything was functioning normally (Kushner, 2013). 
GhostNet/Shadows in the Cloud 
In a collaborative effort, Information Warfare Monitor (IMF) and Shadowserver 
Foundation (2010) documented the complex network of systems used to conduct 
cybercrime and cyber espionage operations against unsuspecting targets in the 
government, academic, and corporate sectors. The research built upon a research effort 
conducted by an Information Warfare Monitor partner, SecDev, titled GhostNet which 




Foundation, 2010). SecDev initiated the GhostNet investigation at the behest of the 
Office of the Holiness the Dali Lama which was a victim of the APT attack (Bradbury, 
2010). 
The IMF and Shadowserver (2010) determined the following: 
 C2 infrastructure leveraged cloud-based social media services in order to 
compromise unsuspecting targets. 
 The complex network of compromised systems employed C2 servers, 
malware, botnets, and drop sites in order to compromise targets and to 
exfiltrate data undetected. 
 Stolen data included classified and sensitive documents as identified by 
classified markings on multiple documents. 
 Hackers exfiltrated data from 44 systems across nine countries. 
The investigation determined that the entire system required four different types 
of hacking tasks in order to successfully complete the task of stealing data (Information 
Warfare Monitor & Shadowserver Foundation, 2010): 
 Malware Authors to develop the malware that compromised target systems. 
 Website Crackers to maintain the malicious websites 
 Envelope Stealers who are individuals who steal username and password 
combinations on compromised networks. 
 Virtual Asset Stealers and Virtual Asset Sellers who possess an 
understanding of what data has value in the underground or criminal 
economy. 
New York Times Attack 
In 2013, the New York Times announced that their network was compromised 
through the installation of malware which led to the extraction of the network’s user 
database (Perlroth, 2013). In its 2014 “M-Trends: Beyond the Breach” Report, Mandiant 
stated that the suspected APT group took specific steps to change their cyber operations 





Discovered in 2013, this Trojan targeted Google Docs. The APT attack leveraged 
this legitimate cloud based Software as a Service (SaaS) in order to leverage the 
legitimate Secure Socket Layer (SSL) of Google Docs to protect their malicious 
communications (Naval, Laxmi, Rajarajan, Gaur, & Conti, 2014). 
With this brief sample the reader can see that detecting APTs is a challenge for 
cybersecurity professionals. Next, we will examine some of the technical reasons that 
make it so difficult. 
 The Cost of the APT Threat 
On a regular and increasingly frequent basis companies, government 
organizations, and industries are reporting breeches of their network and the extraction of 
thousands if not millions of data records. Despite the security measures these 
organizations put in place to ensure the security of the data customers provide to them. 
For example, in 2011 RSA spent $66 million USD to undo the damage caused by an APT 
attack (TrendLabs, n.d.). In a 2015 study by the Ponemon Institute, the researcher 
estimated that it can cost up to $161 each record lost (Ponemon Institute, 2015). When 
one considers that some APT attacks can compromise millions of users’ records the cost 
could potentially bankrupt businesses. 
The threat is not limited to consumer market. The US government’s Office of 
Personnel Management reported a data breech in 2014 which involved 25,000 or more 
personnel records of government employees (Bisson, 2015). Breeches like this could 
present a risk to national security. The Stuxnet attack in 2010 had the potential of causing 
significant damage to nuclear facilities which could place lives and national 
infrastructures at risk as well (Damballa, 2010; Kushner, 2013). It is for this reason that 
the U.S. President issued an Executive Order in 2013 calling for the development of a 
Cyber Resiliency Framework (United States. The White House, 2013). It also prompted 




Understanding the Challenge of Detecting APTs 
With the previous examples providing a context for understanding how APTs 
function we can now address what challenges exist in detecting APTs. While APTs can 
employ a variety of known attack elements (e.g., phishing, malware, etc.) which can be 
detected by current security measures, attackers are still able to execute their attacks 
unnoticed. The question for security professionals, therefore, how are these attackers 
employing these detectable tools in a manner that leaves them undetected. 
Challenges Specific to APT Detection 
Conventional means of intrusion detection often fail to detect APTs because they 
are implemented to mitigate risks associated with automated viruses and worms, not the 
focused manually-operated attack of an APT (Hutchins et al., 2011). In its annual M-
Trends, Mandiant (Mandiant, 2010), estimated that only 24% of APT malware is detected 
by security software. This is due to multiple factors. The target organization’s decision 
not to inspect outbound packets (Ask et al., 2013; Auty, 2015; Villeneuve & Bennett, 
2012). Data is encrypted (Ask et al., 2013; Villeneuve & Bennett, 2012). The affected 
machines send data to a trusted source (Villeneuve & Bennett, 2012).  
Anti-detection Methods Employed with Malware 
As discussed in the previous section, APTs commonly employ malware as a 
means to gain their initial foothold into a target network and to gain elevated permissions 
on host machines. Malware comes in many forms including Trojan horses, worms, 
rootkits, scareware, spyware, and viruses (Egele, Scholte, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2012; 
Sikorski & Honig, 2012). Regardless of which family the malware belongs to the 
software is designed to remain undetected on an infected system (Brand, Valli, & 
Woodward, 2010). 
Malware developers must overcome the various forms of detection the forensics 
analysts use to reveal the presence of malware as described above. Malware developers 






Malware developers employ techniques which detect that their malware is 
running in a virtual environment and the malware will either stay dormant or use 
deception code to provide a false signature to forensic experts trying to dissect the 
malware (Brand et al., 2010). 
Anti-online 
Companies offer third party malware analysis services online. However, there are 
limits to how well these services work because the online environment may not match 
conditions to trigger the malware or it may act differently than it would in a real-world 
network (Brand et al., 2010). 
Anti-Analysis 
Anti-analysis refers to changing the code such that it becomes harder to read 
during the analysis process (Brand et al., 2010; Shosha, James, Hannaway, Liu, & 
Gladyshev, 2012). These techniques target the way analysis is conducted. Code is 
deceptively transformed such that the analysis tools cannot establish a signature for the 
malware (Brand et al., 2010). De-obfuscation methods of analysis fail because that 
analysis happens on the files whereas the malware’s transformation back into identifiable 
malicious code happens in memory as part of the unpacking process (Egele et al., 2012). 
Anti-hardware 
Malware developers can use check to determine whether the malware is being 
analyzed based on signatures of CPU usage and register usage during the debugging 
session (Brand et al., 2010). 
Anti-debugger, Anti-disassembler, and Anti-Tools 
In the same way that malware can detect if the operating system is running in a 
virtual environment, malware developers can design their malware to detect if the code is 





In case the malware analyst is clever or experienced enough to dump memory as a 
means of defeating anti-analysis measures, the malware developer can use anti-memory 
measures in order to frustrate the forensics analyst’s effort. For example, the developer 
can have the packer that unpacks the code into memory to delete code as soon as it is 
executed (Brand et al., 2010). 
Anti-process 
Anti-Process techniques are designed to mitigate the attempts by forensic analysts 
debugging of running processes. The technique changes the entry point from to a 
different one which foils the debugging effort (Brand et al., 2010). 
Packers and Protectors 
Obfuscation and its subset, packing, are techniques used by malware developers 
to make static analysis more difficult for the forensics experts (Brand et al., 2010; 
Sikorski & Honig, 2012). Obfuscation is a means of hiding or disguising code (Sikorski 
& Honig, 2012). Packing uses compression and a wrapping program as a means of 
disguising the true purpose of program (Sikorski & Honig, 2012). Even more challenging 
for analysts and malware detection is recursive packaging which obfuscates code in 
multiple layers of recursive compression (Egele et al., 2012). 
Metamorphic or Polymorphic 
This type of malware is constructed in such a manner that it can re-engineer or 
recode itself (Raj et al., 2014; Sikorski & Honig, 2012). This recoding takes place each 
time it propagates or is distributed through a network. This type of malware hinders the 
use of signature-based protection tools (Raj et al., 2014). 
Defining and Evaluating Open Source Intelligence 
With related research understood, we can start to explore the independent 




address Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) which will be used to establish our ontology 
and as our data for text-mining and link analysis, which will be discussed in the following 
two sections. 
Intelligence organizations and law enforcement at all levels of government use 
data and information found in open sources for decades (Fleisher, 2008; Steele, 2007). 
Traditionally, OSINT was characterized by searching through publicly available sources 
of information to include books, journals, magazines, etc. (Burwell, 1999; Fleisher, 
2008). Steele formalizes the definition of OSINT as “information that has been 
deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled and disseminated to a select audience 
(Steele, 2007, p. 132).” 
Steele (2007) notes that the change to OSINT is the result of three distinct trends 
(1) the proliferation of the Internet; (2) the consequence of the related “information 
explosion” of published useful knowledge which is experiencing an exponential growth; 
and (3) the availability of formerly restricted sources of information resulting from failed 
states and newer non-state threats. Best (2011) acknowledges that the challenge with 
OSINT is not the collection of information but the filtering and distillation of the 
retrieved content into meaningful metadata that can be analyzed. 
The Science of Natural Language Processing 
In this section, we will explore the science of Natural Language Processing 
(NLP). It is broken down into three subsections. First, we will define the concept of 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) and terms used within this field of study that are 
applicable to the present research. Next, we will provide some examples of applications 
of NLP in the public domain. The third section provides a brief examination into how 
NLP analyzes human language. The last section explores some of the NLP tools available 
in the public domain with particular attention to the tools used within the present 
research. 
Defining NLP and Key Terms 
NLP is the science which enables computers to breaking down unstructured 




draws upon the fields of Linguistics, Theoretical Computer Science, Mathematics, 
Statistics, Artificial Intelligence, Psychology and more (Radev, 2015). When we say 
unstructured human language, we refer to language as it is written or spoken. 
While human language has its own structure it is not a structure that is conducive 
for machine searching or for relating ideas, concepts, or terms to one another (Radev, 
2015). Documents that cover a particular area of study are referred to as the corpora 
(Börner, 2007; International Business Machines, n.d.).  
The following list identifies commonly used NLP terms. 
 Information Extraction – The process of extracting structured information 
from unstructured natural language texts (Waldron, n.d.). 
 Bag of Words – A modeling techniques for training the NLP software to 
identify the sentiment of a given passage of text (Waldron, n.d.). 
 Coreference – is the ability of software to identify relationships between 
specific and general terms within a text. Figure 1 is an illustration of 
determining a relationship between the multiple instances of his with 
President Xi Jinping mentioned at the beginning of the sentence. 
 
Figure 1: Visual Representation of Coreference (Stanford NLP Group, n.d.-a) 
 
 Named Entity Recognition (NER) – the process of identifying or classifying 
terms within text by a broader classification (Finkel, Grenager, & Manning, 
2005). Figure 2 illustrates how NLP software uses NER to classify words in 
analyzed text. Table 1: NER Classifications lists the 13 NER classifications used 
by Stanford CoreNLP. It is important to note that the Classification ‘O’ is a 
catch-all for any term that cannot be distinguished as one of the other NERs. 
 





Table 1: NER Classifications 















 Sentiment Analysis – The ability to extract not only terms but also the 
positive or negative tone of the text (Waldron, n.d.). 
 Corpora or Corpus – A large collection of texts within a specific domain 
(Waldron, n.d.) 
 Lemma – the root word of tokens appearing in the corpora or in a single 
document (Jones, 1999). Table 2.1 below provides an illustration. The words 
capture, captured, captures, and capturing appear in the corpus. All of these 
words are derivatives of the lemma capture. 
Table 2: Capture as an example lemma 






Examples of NLP in the Public Domain 
A variety of well-known and frequently used tools apply NLP to accomplish 
specific goals. The most common example is search engines (Radev, 2015). These 
websites, and their related robots, use NLP as a tool to index websites and facilitate user 
searches. Other examples include web-based translation tools (i.e. Google Translate), and 





Another example of an NLP application is International Business Machines’ 
(IBM) Watson Application Program Interface (API). The Watson system, like the other 
NLP tools described later, processes various forms of the written human word (e.g. Word 
Documents, Portable Document Format (PDF), HTML web pages, etc.) and pairs of 
questions and answers are stored within Watson’s database which users can then query 
(International Business Machines, n.d.). 
The Watson application has been used to analyze thousands of medical 
documents and build searchable databases of diseases and their symptoms. Error! 
Reference source not found., below, provides an example of how Watson processes 
numerous medical resources to build a structured understanding of cancer and other 
diseases with similar symptoms, treatments, and side effects.  
 
Figure 3: Watson structures Natural Language Resources within a domain (International Business 
Machines, n.d.). 
Stanford’s CoreNLP 
Stanford’s CoreNLP (CoreNLP) is actively developed by Stanford’s Natural 
Language Processing Group (NLP Group). The NLP Group members include faculty, 
post doctorates, graduates, undergraduates, and programmers (Stanford NLP Group, n.d.-




of speech, proper names of individuals and corporations, markup sentence structure and 
more (Manning et al., 2014). 
BookNLP 
BookNLP is an extension of the CoreNLP. It is designed to scale CoreNLP’s 
functionality to larger source documents (Bamman, Underwood, & Smith, 2014). It also 
leverages MaltParser for dependency parsing (trained on CoreNLP’s typed 
dependencies). The project was last updated over 3 years ago, based on its GitHub 
repository (https://github.com/dbamman/book-nlp),  
Natural Language Toolkit 
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) is a collection of tools written in Python 
designed to work with human language data (Bird, Loper, & Klien, 2009). An open 
source package currently in its third version, NLTK has over 100 predefined corpora and 
training models and can process 14 languages (Bird et al., 2009). 
How NLP Processes Human Language 
The two main functional roles of NLP are semantic and syntactic analysis 
(Collobert et al., 2011). Syntactic focuses on the way language is structured and deriving 
an understanding of the language through the understanding of the structure. Semantics 
focuses on the mapping of language to derive meaning from the way that words are used 
within natural language(Wang, Berant, & Liang, 2015). Collobert et. al. (2011) further 
divides these two areas into four main roles for NLP as follows: 
 Parts of Speech (PoS) Tagging which is used to identify words by their 
syntactic role (e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc.) (Collobert et al., 2011; Wang 
et al., 2015);  
 Shallow Parsing or Chunking which is used to identify syntactic phrases, 
commonly Noun Phrases and Verb Phrases (Collobert et al., 2011);  
 Named Entity Recognition (NER), which identifies parts of the sentence 




 Semantic Role Labelling analyzes the semantics of a sentence and 
establishes relationships between the semantic components (Collobert et al., 
2011). 
Beyond these parsing functions, NLP offers the following functionality when 
processing text: 
 Deep Analytics involves advanced data processing techniques to facilitate 
more precisely targeted and more complex searches (Sims, 2015); 
 Machine Translation which involves converting human text from one 
language to another (Sims, 2015);  
 Co-reference Resolution is a tool that resolve the relationship between terms 
that refer to the same subject (Sims, 2015), and; 
 Automatic Summarization functionality in NLP can be used to produced 
readable summaries of denser texts (Sims, 2015). 
In order for NLP to provide usable data regarding a particular domain it is often 
useful to train the NLP system with a lexicon (Collobert et al., 2011; Hake & 
Vaishalideshmukh, n.d.; Lee et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2015). With the lexicon, the NLP 
application has a starting point from which to analyze documents within a domain. It is 
for this reason that the methodology in the first iteration includes a manual processing of 
documents by the research team. By default, CoreNLP is trained using the coreference 
library developed out of the SIGNLL Conference on Computational Natural Language 
Learning 2011 (CoNNL-11) (Lee et al., 2011). 
The Role of Ontology 
An ontology is designed to establish a common vocabulary and give practitioners 
the ability to easily share concepts (Mundie & McIntire, 2013). An ontology helps 
improve knowledge management within a domain (Dey, Rastogi, & Kumar, 2007). The 
development of an ontology is further intended to streamline the process of information 
sharing and to avoid problems of misrepresentation or miscommunication resulting from 
parties using incompatible terminology (Huang, Acampora, Loia, Lee, & Kao, 2011). 
Previous research in the area of malware analysis and APT detection will be discussed in 





Dey, Rastogi, and Kumar (2007) notes that the role of ontologies is to help 
improve knowledge management by formalizing the representation of domain-specific 
knowledge. Hitzler, et al. (2012) adds that these terms, often referred to as vocabulary, 
are used to precisely describe the domain. These terms can be identified by the frequency 
of their appearance in natural language texts (Dey et al., 2007; P Velardi, Fabriani, & 
Missikoff, 2001). The importance of terms and their relationship to other terms can be 
determined by the co-occurrence of terms within natural language texts (P Velardi et al., 
2001). Karoui, Aufaure, and Bennacer (2007) take co-occurrence one step farther by 
weighting the relationship based on the proximity of terms to one another within the 
document. 
Ontology Development 
Ontologies are developed both vertically and horizontally (Navigli & Velardi, 
2004; P Velardi et al., 2001; Paola Velardi, Faralli, & Navigli, 2013). From top-to-
bottom, terms move from broader terms to more specific ones (Paola Velardi et al., 
2013). For example, if the term at the top of the chain is communication, the next level 
could contain two terms secure and unsecure. Under Unencrypted Communications there 
would be more specific individuals including Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP), and email. Individuals under Secure Communications could 
include Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), Secure Shell (SSH), Secure Copy Protocol 
(SCP), Virtual Private Network (VPN), etc. In other ontologies the subordinate terms 
may also be a part of the parent term (e.g. the lobby of the hotel) (P Velardi et al., 2001). 
Individuals are specific instances of the parent term (i.e. Apache or Nginx are instances 
of a web server) (P Velardi et al., 2001). Figure 4: Example of the Vertical and Horizontal Aspects 
of an OntologyFigure 4, below, is a visual representation of the same. 
 




In addition to classes and individuals, ontologies can specify properties of classes 
and properties of individuals (Horridge, Knublauch, Rector, Stevens, & Wroe, 2004). 
Properties define attributes of a class or an individual. In the example, above, a property 
might be the type of encryption used (e.g. MD5 or SHA2) to encrypt the communication 
or it could be the ports used to communicate between hosts. 
Prior Related Research 
This section will look at some of the research that focus on the use of ontologies 
for malware analysis and the development of fuzzy logic and cognitive agents for use in 
detecting APT attacks. As has been previously illustrated, malware is a significant tool in 
the execution of an APT attack. Therefore, research done in this area is impactful on the 
work in the present effort. 
Mundie and McIntire 
In Mundie and McIntire’s (Mundie & McIntire, 2013) research they sought to 
develop an ontology for Malware Analysis. Their work was motivated by four challenges 
in the business of malware analysis: (1) security teams and their customers were wasting 
time negotiating requirements because they did not “speak the same language;” (2) 
human resources departments couldn’t hire the right malware analysts because they could 
not properly explain job requirements; (3) certification programs did not have a 
standardized way to assess the abilities of malware analysts; and (4) information sharing 
within the malware analysis community is impeded by a lack of shared foundation 
(Mundie & McIntire, 2013). 
Their work employed six increasingly complex levels of knowledge 
representation (Mundie & McIntire, 2013): 
 Controlled Vocabulary – collection of preferred terms. 
 Taxonomy - hierarchically related terms in a controlled vocabulary. 
 Static Ontology – an ontology that describes static aspects of the world. 





 Intentional Ontology – a subjective ontology based on the motivation of 
agents. 
 Meta-model – An ontology template that can generate ontologies by filling-in 
the parameters. 
Their work yielded a vocabulary of approximately 270 malware analysis terms 
and a taxonomy outlined in World Wide Web Consortium’s Web (W3C) Ontology 
Language (OWL). Mundie and McIntire built their initial ontology using the email 
archive of a malware analysis team. They also included various recognized textbooks in 
the malware analysis field and some Internet resources (Mundie & McIntire, 2013). 
Huang, Loia, and Kao 
Huang, Loia, Lee, and Kao (Huang et al., 2011) research sought to apply fuzzy 
logic and ontologies for their application of inferring knowledge about malware, and 
designing an intelligent decision making system whose behavioral rules can be used to 
detect viruses and other malicious programs. As with Mundie and McIntire’s research 
they employed OWL to build their malware behavior ontology (Huang et al., 2011). 
To test the effectiveness of their decision-making system they evaluated its 
performance against 30 “attendance records” from the National Center for High 
Performance and Computing (NCHC) malware repository. Their reported results and 
conclusion indicate that the employment of fuzzy logic and ontology was feasible and 
usable for a malware behavioral analysis system (Huang et al., 2011). 
Meckl, Tecuci, Boicu, and Marcu 
Meckl, Tecuci, Boicu, and Marcu (2015) attempted to improve cyber defense 
against APTs using an operational semantic approach. The motivation for their work was 
to reduce false positives thus increasing the efficiency and reducing the costs associated 
with automated APT analysis. To achieve this, they are proposing developing 
collaborative cognitive agents that can apply updates based on new intelligence. In 





Lundquist, Zhang, and Ouksel 
In Lundquist, Zhang, and Ouksel (Lundquist, Zhang, & Ouksel, 2015), the 
research focused on applying an ontology to the analysis of network traffic in order to 
determine the nature of the traffic as a threat or as innocuous. The extent of the threat (or 
non-threat) is also determined as part of this scan. If the sentiment scan is inconclusive 
the traffic data goes through further processing that involves alternate ontologies and/or 
expanded data from a longer observation window (Lundquist et al., 2015).  
These and potentially other research efforts have some overlap with our current 
effort, but the researcher contends that this does not invalidate our efforts. Instead, the 
researcher holds that the research could augment these other research efforts and others 
like them. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we defined of the term Advanced Persistent Threat both in terms 
of the attack and the actor. With that groundwork laid, we explored the phases of the APT 
attack in the context of the widely-accepted Lockheed Martin “Cyber Kill Chain.” We 
looked at several illustrative historic examples of known APT attacks and the current 
challenges cybersecurity professionals face when trying to detect APT attacks. We also 
examined the costs associated with data breeches resulting from APT attacks. 
We examined the concepts of OSINT, ontology development and natural 
language processing as an intelligence building tool. Finally, we examined prior research 





FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
With definitions, history, and a review of prior APT research complete, it is time 
to layout the approach that the author intends to apply in the present endeavor. This 
chapter will examine the framework, researcher’s biases, the proposed methodology 
including the two phases the research will take, a review of the data to be collected, the 
tools that will be used to analyze the raw data, and finally the researcher’s credibility.  
Framework 
As demonstrated in the literature review, previous research efforts sought to 
develop a meaningful ontology as a part of malware analysis and incorporating a 
semantic approach to improve defense against APT attacks. However, none of these prior 
efforts sought to apply link analysis to the existing APT knowledgebase in an effort to 
refine or improve the threat intelligence that exists for each individual APT. 
The author acknowledges that some corporate entities may have explored 
employing link analysis to expand their threat intelligence about APTs but, that work 
being of a proprietary nature, it has not been published in the public domain as open 
research. 
Researcher Bias 
While there is always a risk of bias when dealing with qualitative or hybrid 
research efforts, steps within the methodology outlined below are designed to minimize 
the possibility that it will affect the outcome of this research effort. My only vested 
interest in this research is to provide the most thorough effort that I can within the time 
parameters available to me.  
Methodology 
This section lays out the methodology used in the research related to this paper. It 





Figure 5: Methodology Workflow 
The first step in the research process involved the collection of OSINT pertaining 
to APT incidents over the past decade. During the literature review research, the search 
for resources uncovered two repositories of documents pertaining to APT attacks. These 
two repositories contain over 700 documents include reports by cybersecurity 
professionals and organizations covering individual incidents and studies of trends about 
cyberattacks over time. Organized by year, these primary sources span from 2008 
through 2016. The size of these repositories provides a significant foundation for building 
this study’s ontology. 
As a part of the merging of the two repositories, this step included the removal of 
duplicates documents. Other documents were removed for other reasons as explained in 
Chapter 4.  
As discussed in the ‘Science of NLP’ section of the Literature Review, in order 
for NLP software to produce the most useful analysis regarding a domain, the software 
needs to be trained regarding the lexicon of the domain. Therefore, the researcher 
selected 5% of the documents randomly from the final knowledgebase and read through 





The next two steps on the methodology were performed in parallel as neither 
required the other as a preceding task. The two steps were the NLP processing of the 
remaining documents in the corpus and the building of an initial ontology using the terms 
identified during the manual analysis.  
The researcher included this step for multiple reasons. First, to understand the 
breadth and scope of an APT domain ontology. Second, as a familiarization with the 
ontology building software used in the research. 
After completing the two parallel tasks, the next step was the extraction of domain 
relevant terms from the processed documents. Using knowledge gleaned from the manual 
processing of documents, I determined to use a statistical approach to initially identify 
ontological terms and then to use contextual analysis to identify additional terms. From 
there I used a tool I am familiar with to build the relational structure of the ontology and 
then connected Protégé to the database in order to develop and the final ontology 
(presented in OWL2 in Appendix C). 
Data Collection 
The data collected in this research comes in two forms. The first is the statistical 
analysis of the tokens outputted by NLP. The second is the identified terms in the APT 
ontology and the lexicon used in the NLP step of the methodology. 
As mentioned in the previous section, statistical analysis of the NLP output (in the 
form of tokens) enabled the identification of terms for use in the ontology and would 
facilitate the identification of additional terms through their contextual use. 
In order to facilitate the statistical analysis of the NLP output, I first turned to 
Excel but the number of tokens in the entire corpus made statistical analysis in excel 
difficult. Excel spreadsheets are limited to 1,048,576 rows or records and, as mentioned 
previously, the corpus of 425 documents consists of 2,423,738 tokens. Therefore, it 
would take three separate tabs of a spreadsheet just to contain the raw data. This would 
make analysis more complex than it needed to be. 
As a result, I turned to MySQL for its ability to handle the 2.4+ million tokens 
(records) in the corpus and use its querying capability to summarize the data the output to 




analyzed those results using Excel and SAS. By summarizing, I am referring to counting 
the number of appearances of original words, lemmas, and NER. I then used that. 
Before selecting terms for the ontology, it was important to gain both a contextual 
understanding of terms as they are used within the texts of the corpus as well as statistical 
analysis of word frequency within it. This process is explained in more detail in Chapter 
4. 
Analysis 
Analysis of the available open source intelligence employed a recognized industry 
standard and the processing of documents were performed with multiple software 
packages. The next section examines the standard and software for developing the 
ontology. It will be followed by a review of the software package chosen by the 
researcher to perform the link analysis of the available OSINT. 
As discussed previously, an accepted industry standard for ontology development 
is OWL, which is currently in its second edition (Huang et al., 2011; W3C OWL 
Working Group, 2012).  OWL2 provides the structure to show the vertical relationship 
between entities and their properties (e.g. communication to secure communications) as 
well as the horizontal relationships between like properties (e.g. SSH to SFTP) (Hitzler et 
al., 2012). 
While OWL2 provides the structure, Protégé provides the user interface to work 
with ontologies. Developed as a tool to develop Semantic Web Applications, Protégé 
provides access to ontologies, as well as tools to visualize, edit and use ontologies 
(Horridge et al., 2004; Knublauch, Fergerson, Noy, & Musen, 2004). Protégé is designed 
to simplify the use of the OWL2’s notoriously difficult structure (Knublauch et al., 2004). 
It’s incorporation in several other ontology development research projects weighed 
heavily in the researcher’s decision to use it for the current research effort (Abulaish & 
Dey, 2007; Huang et al., 2011; Mikroyannidis & Theodoulidis, 2007; Mundie & 
McIntire, 2013). This work was conducted using the Protégé resource, which is supported 
by grant GM10331601 from the National Institute of General Medical Sciences of the 





The credibility of any study is paramount to the researcher and to the product 
developed. The credibility for the present research project will be built on the foundation 
of industry standards for the work being performed as well as widely used and recognized 
tools to perform the work. The use of such standards and tools ensure that the research is 
repeatable by any researcher with access to the tools and the raw data used in this 
endeavor. 
The researcher has 23 years of experience in the arena of networking and 
cybersecurity. Ten years of the 23 have been with the United States Army. As an Officer 
his focus has been on the installation, operation, maintenance, and security of both the 
tactical and operational networks within the Army up to and include theater level 
operational network spanning seven Army installations in the United States Army Pacific 
footprint which stretches from Japan up to Alaska and down to Hawaii. 
Summary 
This chapter examined the framework and methodology the researcher intends to 
employ in the current research. It also addressed the technical tools the research will use 






RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter of the paper is an examination of the methodology employed during 
the research and the analysis of the same. This chapter is broken down into ### sections. 
The first section focuses on building the corpus. The second outlines the manual process 
for building the training lexicon. The third examines the processing of the documents 
through the NLP software and addresses issues with migrating that data into MySQL for 
statistical analysis. The fourth section presents an analysis of the NLP output as well as 
the steps taken to filter through the output in order to find ontological terms more 
efficiently. The fifth section addresses the selection process used to identify ontology 
appropriate terms and the building of the ontology structure itself. 
Building the Corpus 
As previously discussed, the first step of the research relied on two APT 
documentation repositories found on GitHub. After downloading both repositories they 
contained a combined 742 files. Several files had issues (e.g. unprintable characters in the 
filename, filenames greater than 256 characters, etc.) that were correctable without 
impacting the integrity of the file’s content. However, many files were excluded from the 
process for various reasons. These reasons are as follows: 
 Two hundred and ninety-two (292) files were duplicates as determined by the 
tool fslint. 
 Ten (10) files were excluded because they were written in foreign languages. 
While there are online tools that can translate documents; given the limited 
number of documents, my lack of knowledge of these languages, and time it 
was more efficient to eliminate them. 
 Eight (8) files were eliminated because they were encrypted, or had errors that 
prevented text extraction by the text extraction tool. 
 Six (6) files generated errors for invalid PDF formats while trying to extract 





 Despite all software support recommendations, the parsing of one (1) 
continually failed. 
With 314 files either duplicates or containing issues that made them unusable for 
this study, the ontology development relied upon 425 documents pertaining to various 
APT attacks over the last eight years. 
During this process, each document received a document number, primarily as a 
means to track the processing of documents. Secondarily to facilitate the random 
selection of the documents that I used to establish the initial lexicon. 
Building the Initial Training Lexicon 
As described in Chapter 2, NLP software needs to be “training” when it starts 
working with documents in a new domain in order to better identify parts of speech, 
named entities, etc. In order to establish the training lexicon, I selected 22 documents 
randomly using the document numbers assigned during the “Establishing the Corpus” 
phase, described above, and a random number generator. 
The 22 documents selected, represented just over 5% of the total corpus (5.02%) 
and the random number generator ensured that the documents covered a diverse number 
of incidents. While reading through the original documents provided the initial lexicon, 
formatting requirements for the lexicon necessitated that I also process the documents 
through the NLP software in order to simplify the building of the training file. However, 
there were issues with the NLP software’s output that could not be avoided and which 
will be discussed in the next subsection. 
Processing Documents through BookNLP 
After extracting the plain text out of the documents in the corpus the natural 
language processing of the documents began. As discussed in Chapter 3, I employed 
Stanford CoreNLP through the extension BookNLP to process the text in all the 
documents. 
Numerous documents still contained what the software flagged as ‘Untokenizable  




These messages appeared to be warnings as the software successfully completed its 
execution. 
Errors with NLP Output 
During my early experimentation with CoreNLP and BookNLP I ran into errors 
processing some of the PDF documents including the types of issues mentioned above. In 
order to avoid eliminating more documents for technical issues, I extracted the text of 
these files using the Python script pdf2txt.py. Even after performing this step there were 
some issues which are outlined below along with steps taken to correct these errors. 
Unhandled Exception 
While MySQL imported the tab delimited output from BookNLP, some of the 
documents generated the error in Figure 6 and the process simply failed. 
 
Figure 6: “Unhandled Exception” Error 
Examining the file revealed a non-ASCII character in the “Original Word.” The 
character in question is shown in line 442 in Figure 7. Given that this token is not one 
that would be used in the ontology the easiest solution was to replace the character with a 
number. 
 




Import File Error – Non-ASCII Character 
When there were non-ASCII characters (as shown in Figure 7) in the first row of 
the of the tab delimited file the error messages in Figure 8 were displayed and no records 
were imported. Clicking through this error resulted in the error in Figure 9. As with the 
“Unhandled Exception” error above, replacing these with an ASCII punctuation 
character. 
 
Figure 8: “Import Error” Issue 
 




Import File Error – Quotation Marks 
This error was more challenging to uncover because no errors were generated. 
The file would process correctly but later I would discover a discrepancy in the number 
of records in the document table and the largest token ID as generated by BookNLP. 
Through trial and error, I realized that the errors were being caused by different quotation 
marks within the original text as shown in Figure 10. Escaping the quotations with a 
backslash (\) corrected this problem. 
 
Figure 10: Quotation Marks Example 
Escaping Characters 
As with the problem described in the previous subsection regarding quotation 
marks. There were many other characters that generated errors during the MySQL import 
because they are special characters that MySQL treats differently including the backslash 
(\). In order to be processed properly these special characters need to be escaped with a 
backslash just as in the example above. With the NLP processing complete and all the 
data imported into the MySQL database, it is time to proceed with the statistical analysis 
of the NLP output itself. 
Examining the Documents in the Corpus 
A person reading a book processes what he reads very differently from an NLP 
program that breaks the document down into tokens. While this can be understood 
conceptually, when the processing was complete and all the data was imported into the 
database it was daunting to see that there were more than 2.4 million tokens in the 




ontology in the time afforded to me. I determined that in order to build the ontology it 
was necessary to reduce the number of records in order to get to the most meaningful and 
useful terms. 
The following five subsections provide statistical analysis of the database and 
walk the reader through the steps taken to remove extraneous words and get to those 
words that are useful for ontology development in this domain. The first section looks at 
the concept of the token. The second examines all the tokens produced by BookNLP. The 
third explains the removal of common word tokens. The fourth explores the use of 
lemma. The last examines the NER as another means of interpreting the data. 
Understanding the Tokens 
Reading through the Processing the 22 documents produced 128,120 total tokens 
with only a small percentage of these tokens being significant for building the APT 
Ontology. there was a significant amount of clutter or noise within these documents that 
had to be sifted through to find the needed keywords. Figure 11, below, is a sample of the 
tokenized output generated by BookNLP for one of the selected documents. Notice that 
line 10 is the possessive apostrophe s (‘s) that is actually part of the word in the previous 
token (Storm). Figure 11 contains a partial list of this and similar tokens in those 22 
documents. 
 
Figure 11: Sample of Document Tokens 
Another issue with how the NLP software parsed the documents can be seen in 
lines 8 and 9 of Figure 11. BookNLP broke up a two-word phrase which is actually the 
name of the APT discussed in the document. Therefore, in order to build an accurate 
lexicon required human intervention to modify the normal function of the software. 
The issues described in this subsection are not an indictment of the software, it is 
functioning as the designers intended. In fact, my inexperience with the software 




Examining the Corpus Tokens 
With an understanding of what tokens are established, we can move forward and 
look at the corpus. The corpus consists of various types of documents including blog 
posts, corporate white papers, and academic explorations of various APTs. The 425 
documents contain 2,423,738 tokens in total.  
 
Figure 12: Distribution of Tokens (by Document) 
 
The mean tokens in a given document is 5702.91294. The largest document 
contains 84,473 tokens while the smallest consists of 393 tokens. Table 3, below, 
highlights the quantile data for all tokens in the Corpus Documents. The histogram 
(Figure 12), illustrates the breakdown of the documents by the number of tokens 
extracted during the NLP processing of the corpus. It shows 277 documents (65.18% of 
the total) contain less than 5393 tokens. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the documents 
contain less than 7,144 tokens. These two statistics coincide with the fact that most 
documents were website reports and summary white papers. The two outlying documents 




Table 3: Quantiles for All Tokens in the Corpus 
Level Quantile 
100% Max 84,473 
99% 26,705  
95% 16,562  
90% 13,116  
75% Q3 7,144  
50% Median 3,611  
25% Q1 1,924  
10% 1,203  
5% 986  
1% 509  
0% Min 393  
 
These numbers reflect all tokens within the documents. They include 
punctuations, symbols, and numbers as well as actual words. While these tokens provide 
important information and context they are not likely to contain ontologically meaningful 
terms. Removing these tokens from the documents we are left with the words that may be 
included in the ontology. 
Table 4: Quantiles for All Words in the Corpus 
Level Quantile 
100% Max 44,824  
99% 22,008  
95% 12,938  
90% 9,824  
75% Q3 5,521  
50% Median 2,838  
25% Q1 1,561  
10% 990  
5% 818  
1% 408  
0% Min 198  
 
The mean number of words in the corpus documents is 4441.64706 while the 
median is 2,838 as shown in Table 4. Ninety-five percent (95%) of the documents are 




size, these sizes make perfect sense. However, this is still a large number of terms that 
need to filtered down in order for me to more readily identify ontological terms. 
Removing Common Words from the Data 
Examining the corpus tokens, it quickly became obvious that there were 
frequently appearing words that would not provide anything useful for ontology 
development. With some additional investigation and research, I realized that the words 
appearing in the corpus with the greatest frequency were contained within the list of the 
most common words in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (CoCA) (Davies, 
2016). Table 5, below, shows the 10 most common words in the CoCA with their 
appearance rate in all 425 corpus documents. 
 





% of Corpus 
Tokens 
the 107,486 252.9082 5.6940 
be 50,884 119.7271 2.6956 
and 38,463 90.5012 2.0376 
of 42,756 100.6024 2.2650 
a 41,026 96.5318 2.1733 
in 28,241 66.4494 1.4961 
to 41,211 96.9671 2.1831 
have 10,678 25.1247 0.5657 
it 9,145 21.5176 0.4845 
I 1,583 3.7247 0.0839 
 
Filtering out the 5,000 most common words in the contemporary American 
English language removed 1,248,000 of the words in the corpus or 66.1122% of the word 
tokens within the corpus. This process left the corpus with 639,700 original words. 
 Using Lemma 
In an effort to further reduce clutter within the summarization, I sought more 
potential ways to combine rows in the summary table. The lemma provided a tailored 




beginning with the word ‘alert.’ The search produced 12 rows of data based with 9 
unique lemmas. 

















 alert  JJ 
107 265 
68 172 
 alerted  VBD 19 25 
 alerting  VBG 12 12 





 NN 1 1 1 1 
alert-avoiding  Alert-avoiding  JJ 1 1 1 1 
Alert/Scarewar
e 
 Alert/Scareware  NNP 1 1 1 2 
alert5  alert5  NN 1 1 1 1 
alerted16  alerted16  CD 1 1 1 1 
Alerter  Alerter  NNP 1 1 1 3 
Alerts  Alerts  NNP 5 5 5 5 
alertwall.exe  alertwall.exe  NN 1 1 1 1 
 
From this table, we can see that the lemma alert has 4 variations for the text 
actually found in the documents (alert, alerted, altering, and alerts). The lemma alert 
appears in 107 total documents and appears a total of 265 times. 
There are two important items to note at this juncture. One is a point about what 
might appear as a mathematical discrepancy and the other is a result of the NLP software. 
Regardless of the issues that will be explained momentarily the final compilation 
of tokens resulted in 98,945 lemmas with 97,886 variations. Only 2,772 Lemma or 
2.80156% had more than one variation. 
Discrepancy between Variation and Lemma Counts 
Looking at Table 6, once again, one will note that there is a difference between the 
number of documents by Lemma and by word variation for the words with the lemma 
alert (107 vs. 136). After some evaluation, the reason for the difference is the overlapping 




and altered may appear in the same document and will be counted once for each variation 
but only once for the lemma. 
Multiple Lemma for One Variation 
The second issue was far subtler to detect. While the first lemma in Table 6 
includes the variation alerts there is a second lemma (Alerts in the second to last row) 
that has the same variation, Alerts. Taking into account just the variation both instances 
of the word alerts should fall under the lemma alert and appear in 38 documents a total of 
61 times. However, upon further investigation, the difference comes down to the part of 
speech. The first instance is a verb while the second is part of a noun phrase. Therefore, 
CoreNLP and, by extension, BookNLP recognizes the lemma for the noun as alerts 
instead of alert. 
In total, there were only 1,057 distinct variations identified by multiple lemma. 
Only 1 variation had more than 2 lemmas associated with it. Table 7, below, provides a 
sample of the typical situations where this occurred. 
 








SYS 3 sy, sy., sys 102 
02i 2 02i, 02us 14 
0xed 2 0xe, 0xed 3 
10ms 2 10m, 10ms 1 
2000s 2 2000, 2000s 10 





Examining the NER 
As discussed in Chapter 2, NLP employs a classification system when identifying 
Named Entity Recognition (NER) for each token. The tool identifies each token by one 
of 13 classifications. The first column in Table 8 shows the classification type. The second 




after all punctuation, numbers only, and common word tokens were removed, 
respectively. The third and fifth columns represent the percentages of corpus tokens, 
again before and after the removal of less useful tokens. As a reminder, the Classification 
‘O’ is a catch-all for all tokens that the Classifier cannot identify as one of the other 12 
classifications. Figure 13, Provides a stacked graph illustrating the same calculations. 
 
Table 8: NER Classifications 
NER 
Classification 
Base Tokens Adjusted Tokens 
Count Percent Count Percent 
O       2,117,681  87.37%       1,698,627  89.98% 
Number         136,643  5.64%           57,833  3.06% 
Date           41,099  1.70%           19,228  1.02% 
Organization           40,617  1.68%           39,861  2.11% 
Misc           20,985  0.87%           20,478  1.08% 
Location           16,864  0.70%           16,859  0.89% 
Percent           13,998  0.58%             4,754  0.25% 
Person           11,236  0.46%           11,229  0.59% 
Time             8,598  0.35%             7,403  0.39% 
Duration             6,194  0.26%             5,603  0.30% 
Money             6,012  0.25%             2,069  0.11% 
Ordinal             3,267  0.13%             3,267  0.17% 
Set               544  0.02%               489  0.03% 
        2,423,738  100.00%       1,887,700  100.00% 
 
That there are still tokens which are classified by numbers, dates, time, and other 
numerically related classifications is the result of CoreNLP’s identifying words that 
represent numbers (e.g. one, ten, fifth, etc.). The NER classifications for locations and 
organizations, and people proved useful in the current research as it helped to extract 
target locations, organizations and individuals for some of the APT attacks. However, the 
NER classification system was not perfect for the current research. During the processing 






Figure 13: NER Classification Breakdown 
NER Misidentification 
The first of these issues was misidentification. The software is only as good as the 
training that the classifier has prior to analysis of a document. Without additional training 
for the software many tokens were misidentified. For example, Bitdefender, Bitcoin, 
FT.com, and other tokens were misidentified as locations. Another instance of 
misidentification can be seen in blog URLs. In Figure 14, below, shows five URLs that 
contain these dates. 
 
Figure 14: Sample of URLs Misidentified as Dates 
Multi-Token NER Issue 
The second issue is not an error as much as it is just the result of the way 
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document down into individual words, any location, organization or individual that spans 
more than one word is not tracked as such. For example, United Nations or United States 
each exist as two tokens in the corpus instead of one. 
With the data extracted from the documents and summarized within MySQL, we 
can move forward into the process of laying out the structures of the ontology and 
identifying terms to fill it. 
Building the Ontology 
With the documents processed, the data imported and summarized for statistical 
analysis and identification of terms. The first subsection will focus on the process gone 
through to select terms. The second will address the ontological structure as designed. 
Selecting Terms for the Ontology 
In the previous section, you were presented with some of the statistical analysis 
done to evaluate the nature of the corpus collected. However, apply statistical analysis for 
the purpose of identifying potential ontological terms. To this end, examining the 
frequency of terms as a means of doing just that. To this end, I considered five different 
permutations. They were: 
 Appearances 
 Appearances per Document 
 Appearances per Corpus Documents 
 Percentage of Corpus Documents  
 Percentage of Corpus Tokens 
The reasons for accepting and rejecting these different values are explained in the 
following two subsections. The third subsection, discusses how the accepted calculations 
were applied to the corpus. 
Statistical Analyses that were Applied 
In order to identify potential terms, it is useful to understand how the frequency of 




identify potentially useful term. They are Appearances per Document, Appearances per 
Corpus Documents, and Percentage of Corpus Documents. 
Appearances per Document is the ratio of total appearances divided by the 
number of documents the word appears in. This number assumes that the number of 
appearances within the documents that it appears; indicating it is an important term. The 
range of values for this statistic ranges from 1 to 716.25. 
Percentage of Corpus Documents uses the simple percentage of all corpus 
documents that the given term appears in. The mean percentage is 0.541% or 
approximately 2.3 documents while the minimum is 0.2353% (1 document) and 
maximum is 95.059% (404 documents). The mean percentage represents approximately  
Appearances per Corpus Documents divides the number of appearances based on 
the total of 425 documents in the corpus. This is an effort to normalize the appearances 
across all documents. Whereas the minimum and maximum of the Appearances per 
Document ranged from 1 to 716.25, the range for Appearances per Corpus Documents is 
from 0.0024 to 47.1882. The mean is 0.014 and the mode is 0.0024. 
Identifying words based on these three measurements alone would have included 
terms that would not provide anything meaningful to the ontology. Table 9 shows the top 
15 tokens by each of the statistics. The reader will see clear overlap in the three lists as 


















cid 716.250 cid 47.188 malware 95.059 
soft@hotmail.com 206.000 malware 19.969 data 88.235 
xfish 197.000 ’s 14.421 server 80.235 
Ponmocup 170.000 data 11.645 ’s 79.529 
JinDiQIAO@ 
hotmail.com 162.000 server 9.713 malicious 77.882 
ShimRat 162.000 C 7.875 Windows 75.529 
Packrat 146.000 Windows 6.696 Microsoft 71.059 
Exposureindicating 143.000 S 5.998 attackers 69.412 
TERRACOTTA 137.000 attackers 5.974 IP 68.706 
Xing 127.000 com 5.911 further 64.941 
gif.dec 126.000 IP 5.741 C 64.000 
Mofang 111.000 C2 5.595 email 60.235 
GreenSky27 110.000 malicious 5.468 servers 59.529 
2_digits 107.000 C&C 5.426 executable 59.059 
Invincea 91.000 Microsoft 4.520 detection 58.118 
 
Statistical Analyses that were Rejected 
The Percentage of all Corpus Tokens is a ratio of the number of appearances 
divided by the total number of corpus tokens (1,887,700). However, it quickly became 
apparent that this ratio would not be a useful statistic for screening. Only one word 
represents more than 0.44959474 % of the corpus and a single appearance in the corpus is 
0.00005297% of the whole and only 9,299 words that individually make up 
0.00026487% or more of the corpus. The minor variation in the values makes 
distinguishing the value of this statistic difficult to use. 
Figure 15, below, is a graphing of individual token counts as a percentage of the 
corpus that count represents. While there is measurable change from the smallest (1 
appearance) to the largest (20,055 appearances), distinguishing the percentage difference 
between numbers closer together is subtler. Whereas, Figure 16, illustrates the percentages 





Figure 15: Representation off appearance Count as a Percentage of the Entire Corpus 
 
Figure 16: Appearance Ratio for All Tokens in the Corpus 
The second statistic rejected for use was the statistic of Appearances. As a 
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the overall corpus. Looking at this number by itself does not distinguish between a word 
appearing many times in one document or numerous times in one or a few documents. 
How Analyses were Applied 
Using these three measurements in combination with knowledge gained from the 
manual processing of documents and reviews of the documents terms were extracted 
from and it took 15-20 hours to identify terms from the entire corpus. In total, the process 
garnered in excess of 2,000 terms were identified as classes, identities and properties for 
APTs and their subcomponents. In retrospect, the process was not perfect. Chapter 5 
includes a discussion and an assessment of the process. 
Building the Ontology Structure 
With the terms extracted from the OSINT it was a matter of building and 
populating the ontology. However, this is not as simple as the statement above might 
make it appear. The next subsection outlines the first step of organizing and identifying 
the terms and the role that they serve in the ontology. The second outlines how the 
organization of the ontology was decided upon and touches on some of the versions that 
were ultimately rejected. The last subsection provides a brief overview of how the 
structure moved from concept to reality. 
Classifying and Categorizing Terms 
The first step in the process required the identification of terms in one of several 
areas: 
Class 
Any term that is not a by name reference. Instead it describes a larger group to 
which subclasses or identities would belong. APT, itself was an easy class to identify and 
subclasses of APT are Organization and Attack. In some cases, classes were defined by 
groups of individual entities that share a common relationship. An example of this is the 
class Protocol. Under protocol were included the various protocols identified by name 





Individual terms are those terms that represent specific instances of a class. An 
example of this would be specific nations defined as Targets of a particular APT. Another 
would be the specific name of an APT Attack or APT Organization. From a 
programming standpoint, this is equivalent to the instantiation of a class. 
Not every class has an individual because there are details that may not have been 
details that were not contained in a given whitepaper or even known by its author. The 
best example of these would-be personnel within an organization. The ontology includes 
the “job positions” with some definition but few whitepapers actually contained names of 
people within these organization. The way these organizations appear to function, names 
would probably change so frequently that to maintain that sort of information would be 
impossible. 
Property 
A property is simply an attribute of a class or individual entity. Properties of a 
class are placeholders for values that the individual instance will fill. A variety of 
variable types were used for these properties. Most properties used strings to specify 
values but in some instances, it was just as efficient and simple example of this is the port 
that a protocol uses to communicate. Some of the other properties are Boolean in nature. 
There is one property that all classes (and thus individuals have) and that is the 
property labeled Alias. From an ontological standpoint, aliases are just a string variable 
but for purposes of this specific ontology they are actually a very important property. As 
ontologies are designed to standardize language, I thought it was important to include a 
property that includes any alternate versions of a term found within the corpus. 
Table 10, below, shows just some of the variations for the term Command and 
Control found in the corpus. As discussed in the previous section on NLP, some of these 
lines might be the result of NLP processing but it is clear that there is enough variation in 
the way the term Command and Control is identified that it only seemed logical that these 





Table 10: Aliases for Command and Control that Appearing in the Corpus 
Lemma Variation Documents Appearances 
c&c C&C 171 2306 
c2 C2s 29 72 
c2 C2 169 2378 
c2host C2host 1 1 
c2host C2host 1 1 
c2infrastructure C2infrastructure 1 1 
c2s C2s 2 2 
commandandcontrol commandandcontrol 1 2 
command-and-control command-and-control 1 1 
command-and-control command-and-controls 1 1 
command-and-control Command-and-control 81 150 
  
Organizing the Ontology 
With the terms identified and categorized, the ontology was ready to be organized 
into a structure. With such a large group of terms it was easier to work with them in small 
groups and this worked well with building classes as well. However, while Protégé may 
be an intuitive tool for some, it was not so in this case. Limited experience with the tool 
meant is was as much of a hindrance to the process as anything else. 
Building the Draft Ontology 
Given that data about the terms was already contained within a database and my 
familiarity with the tools that MySQL offers for database design, it made sense to create 
the structure within MySQL. Figure 17, below, shows the first draft of the ontology as 
developed in MySQL Workbench. 
A familiarity with relational databases made it easy to conceptualize the work 
being done and the structure required. Tables represented classes. Columns represented 
properties that the classes possessed. Rows within the table became individual 
instantiations of the particular class. Foreign keys indicated relationships between classes 
and allowed for a many-to-many relationship exist between different classes. 
Figure 18, below, shows the Protocol class. It has several properties including the 




Class has relationships with Legitimate Software (legal software used for illicit means) as 
well as Malware, Command-and-Control (not shown), etc.  
 
 
Figure 17: MySQL Database of Ontology Structure 
 
 
Figure 18: An example of a Class when viewed as a MySQL database table 
After the draft was built it was easy to create the database. Records for individual 
identities were added to the appropriate tables along with all properties. Working with a 
familiar tool made for more expedient work and made for less issues with assigning 
information to their proper location. Once the work was complete within the database, the 




I was then able to import that structure into Protégé and make the structural 
changes required to account for something that I had not considered during the drafting 
process (e.g. an unforeseen relationship, or a new property). 
Basic Structure 
Figure 17, above, is divided into two sections as represented by the two 
background colors. The two regions represent the two subclasses of Advanced Persistent 
Threat. The upper third (in red) contains elements of the ontology which focus upon the 
Organizational subclass. The lower two-thirds (in green) contains elements related to the 
Attack subclass. 
As the tables reflect classes it takes a little maneuvering to get them where they 
need to be when placed inside the ontology. While each class is represented by a table in 
MySQL, tables are not nested within tables to reflect the subclass nature that they 
represent in the ontology. Within Protégé it is a relatively easy process to move classes 
within the structure to create the class-subclass structure desired. Figure 19, below, is an 
illustration of nesting the table for Malware under the attack class.  
 
Figure 19: The class-subclass structure in Protégé 
Figure 20, illustrates the nesting of subclasses within subclasses as the target tables 
for nations, industries, organizations and software are nested within a targets class that 
did not actually exist as a table within the database but made perfect sense for the 





Figure 20: Nesting of Classes 
Summary 
In this chapter, we examined this paper’s related research. It examined the steps 
taken to evaluate and merge the two open source knowledgebases to establish the corpus. 
We explored the various challenges both in processing the documents with CoreNLP and 
with importing the NLP output into a database for statistical analysis and identification of 
key terms for the ontology. It concluded with the logic and process used to identify the 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The work for this research is done. Its objective was to establish an open source 
ontology for use in the Advanced Persistent Threat domain. In this chapter, we will 
review a summary of the study looking at the purpose, significance, and methodology. 
After which, some future research recommendations will be presented which can use the 
work done here both to take advantage of this work and to advance it such that its 
relevance to the cybersecurity community may continue beyond the present effort. 
Summary of Study 
This section is intended to be a retrospective review of the purpose and 
significance of the study, and a review of the methodology employed herein. 
Purpose of Study 
In a world where so much of our commerce, infrastructure, and even national 
defense depends on the communication pathways provided by the internet, failure to 
detect and mitigate the threat represented by APTs could impact businesses, civilian 
infrastructure, and potentially national security of all nations. Current CND measures are 
unable to reliably and regularly detect APTs that compromise both commercial and 
government networks. Part of the problem is incomplete understanding of these APTs 
and to see the various components of a single APT attack as parts of the larger whole. 
The goal of this research was threefold. First, to collate OSINT found in the 
public domain about the individual APTs and from that knowledge build an ontology for 
the entire domain. Second, was to enable the standardization of language so as to 
facilitate easier communication about the domain. Third, was that this research could 
inform cybersecurity professionals with the knowledge that can be incorporated into the 




Significance of Study 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the importance of the current research is how it can 
standardize terminology and definitions as well as providing a comprehensive 
informational resource for the cybersecurity and IT communities. Whether the ontology 
supports research designed to protect networks or to provides information that can be 
used when performing risk assessments and disaster recovery plans. Having a foundation 
of common terms and definitions for this domain will help share the results of disparate 
research findings and the development of business plans designed to protect networks 
from would-be attackers. 
The variation of terms used in the small sample size as this was intriguing. In a 
profession where acronyms are used so frequently, the variation in what terms and 
acronyms are used and how they are used is analogous to two people speaking in 
different dialects or using colloquialisms that convey different means to each of the 
parties. This work has given me (and hopefully my reader) an appreciation for 
minimizing those differences need to be minimized in order to maximize communication 
and ultimately results. 
Methodology Review 
With the work complete and looking back at the path the research has taken, I 
believe that the methodology was sound but there are some realities that could have been 
better planned for. Because of challenges faced along the way minor adjustments were 
made in order to keep the work moving forward. As mentioned in Chapter 4, while 
MySQL was originally intended to be a solution for collating the output from the NLP 
process, in the end it offered me a path to get around challenges faced with Protégé and 
building the ontology.  
When issues arose either with software errors or technology limitations, I found 
alternate paths around the problem. As a technology professional and a leader of Soldiers, 
it is what is expected when adversity presents itself. So, when the research faced a 




As a person who has worked in the technology field for almost 25 years, the 
opportunity to learn new software and new technologies has always been an exciting part 
of the job. I’ve rarely felt like I was not up to the challenge that comes from exploring 
new arenas. However, in this instance, the research faced challenges because for several 
factors which we will explore in the following subsections. 
Learning Curve 
As mentioned previously, I relish the opportunity to explore new technologies. 
However, several of the programs used in this research were not intuitive in a manner that 
foster quick learning and mastery. Learning the finer points of CoreNLP, BookNLP, and 
Protégé took far more time than I originally envisioned. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
challenge of mastering Protégé made me have to rely more heavily on MySQL than I 
initially planned. 
There were points during the research that I looked for other software options 
both for the processing of documents and building the ontology but with time as an 
always looming factor, it ultimately came down to plodding ahead with the software the 
research started with. 
Software Challenges 
Protégé and CoreNLP are both comprehensive programs and there are numerous 
plugins that enable greater functionality. With time constraints to complete this work and 
my limited programming experience in Java and Python, I believed that these numerous 
extensions of the two programs would enable me find a solution that time and my 
programming limitations prevented me from addressing myself. 
However, as I quickly came to learn, many of these plugins were developed by 
researchers like myself. The solutions they developed address a particular research 
challenge they faced and had the time to develop themselves. This meant that some of the 
plugins were focused to meet a very specific task and thus were not a 100% solution as I 
hoped and trying to use two or three plugins to address my need became more of a 




Also, in many cases when the research was done or the funding stopped the 
developers stopped updating the plugins. While the developers of the main software 
packages continue to release new versions the plugin developers do not and as the core 
software changes, the plugin may or may not continue to function with the newer version 
of the core software. 
Another effect of these orphaned plugins was a challenge in finding support. One 
of the foundations of open source software development is that there is a community of 
users ready to help one another should one user find himself facing an issue he cannot 
solve on his own. However, when it comes to these orphaned pieces of software there 
may or may not be the people in the community who know how to help a user who is 
trying to get past a cryptic error. 
In summary, the assumption that there would be solutions readily available to deal 
with any problem was a bigger assumption than should have been made. At least given 
the restraints placed on it. Given what I’ve learned over the past months, my 
recommendation to anyone doing this type of work is to allow the research team the time 
necessary to examine what software has been developed, what state that software is in, 
and what resources are available to resolve issues when they arise. With the summary of 
study complete, we will conclude this work by examining some recommendations for 
future related research.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
The work done here was designed to be as complete a work as can be done from a 
small sample of the content available on APTs as has been developed over the last 
decade. However, it was intended to be just the first step in a larger effort. 
New APT organizations will develop new, and likely, more complex attacks and 
employ new techniques to defeat security measures implemented by cybersecurity 
professionals. Therefore, this ontology must continue to evolve, to expand, and, if 
necessary, be restructured in order to meet those new challenges. 
The next three subsections recommend different ways in which the work here can 





The first section contains recommendations about means to expand this ontology 
and how to integrate it with other related ontologies in the public domain. The second 
section proposes the use of this ontology with the science of Link Analysis in order to 
potentially develop inferred understanding of new APTs in the future as well as means to 
insulate a network from such an attack. The second section also explores means of 
measuring the knowledge gained in this manner. The third, and final, subsection looks at 
applying this ontology in support of Cyber Resiliency Frameworks which were 
developed to help organizations protect their processes and their IT infrastructure from 
APT attacks. 
Expand the Ontology 
The work begun here should be only the first step. Ontologies are intended to be 
maintained and expanded as the domain they describe changes and grows. To let any 
ontology to atrophy is to degrade its usefulness and limit its meaningfulness. Therefore, 
this section, and its subsections, briefly explore ways to keep this ontology meaningful in 
the APT domain. 
Incorporate Other Related Ontologies  
The OWL2 standard for ontology development allows for ontologies to build 
upon one another and expand their usefulness while reducing the amount of work it takes 
to do so. During this research, a concerted effort was taken to build a unique product in 
large part because it had to stand on its own for academic scrutiny. 
However, as we move past this specific research, efforts should be made to 
incorporate applicable ontologies. For example, malware ontologies and ontologies that 
look at the larger cybersecurity domain could provide meaningful information with terms, 
attributes and properties already written in standardized language. 
Apply the Ontology for Further Ontology Development 
This research used only two finite knowledgebases with which to establish the 




regularly. Using the ontology established herein, future research should explore ways for 
this ontology to enable searching for additional data. 
Terms collected here (both general and identifying) should be used to find more 
published materials available in Open Source. This new information would then be 
incorporated back into the ontology and to keep it current with the changing face of the 
APT threat. 
Improve Knowledge through Link Analysis 
The commonality of terms demonstrated in the current research illustrates that 
there are similarities between APT campaigns. Whether different attack employ the same 
botnet, malware, or two campaigns are waged by the same group, inference can reveal 
information that may not be explicitly stated about an APT through the application of link 
analysis. 
The next section examines the role of link analysis to improve or expand 
knowledge. The following section examines the role of knowledge management and 
suggests an approach for scoring or measuring the knowledge known vs. what is inferred 
through link analysis in the proposed future research.  
The Role of Link Analysis 
Also referred to as relationship extraction, it is the identification of relationships 
between two or more entities whether they are individuals, organizations, entities, etc. 
(Best, 2011). The relationship between them is derived from the context in which the 
reference is used. For example, if ABC Corporation’s Finance Department is managed by 
Jenny Grier, VP of Finance and JJ and Anna Glass are Billing Managers within the 
department then there is a boss-employee relationship or association between them as 





Figure 21: An Example of Link Analysis 
The research performed my Ben-Dov, et.al. (Ben-Dov, Wu, Cairns, & Place, 2004) 
explores the use of link analysis and inference from that analysis can produce increased 
knowledge. Their efforts were an extension of prior done by Davies, and Swanson and 
Smalheiser (Ben-Dov et al., 2004). One of the biggest challenges to their research is that 
contemporary link-analysis tools operated on structured data (Ben-Dov et al., 2004). 
They overcame the obstacle by processing text through information extraction or text 
mining as a precursor to the link analysis. 
For their research, Ben-Dov, et.al. (Ben-Dov et al., 2004) used two different 
methods for text mining that the present research must consider. Co-occurrence links uses 
pattern matching to determine if target phrases exist within a sentence. However, the 
mechanism does not apply any semantics or syntactic logic to determine how the two 
terms relate to one another. The second method that they employed Semantic links work 
by connect noun phrases and verb identification with the application of linguistic and 
semantic constraints. They accomplished this by using Declarative Information Analysis 
Language developed at ClearForest Labs (Ben-Dov et al., 2004). 
The Ben-Dov et al. research is part of a larger domain referred to as Network 
Science. It is identified as an emerging discipline which examines the interconnections 
among diverse entities (Börner, Sanyal, & Vespignani, 2007). The use of the work 
network is not intended to limit this science to computer networks. It is intended to 
describe interrelations between any group of nodes or entities. For example, these could 
be biological entities within a biosphere, or the relationship between cited research within 




develop theoretical and practical approaches and techniques to increase our 
understanding of natural and man made[sic] networks (Börner et al., 2007, p. 538).” 
Measuring Knowledge 
Knowledge management is a relatively new field of study that grew out of the 
change to the American business world from primarily manufacturing and industrial to a 
structure that focuses on service-oriented business. This change created the demand 
within business for companies to better measure a wealth built upon the knowledge and 
experience of its employees.  
However, the means for measuring and, more importantly, valuing the knowledge 
as an asset to a given company was a challenge. Something as tacit as knowledge was 
difficult to quantify and even harder to put a dollar value on. 
The following subsections provide a very brief overview of the thinking that 
businesses apply in the measurement of knowledge and provides a simple 
recommendation for measuring knowledge gained through inference in the proposed 
future research. 
A Brief History of Knowledge Management 
The shift in business models and the lack of a standard system for valuing 
knowledge created a gap which needed to be filled. academia and business economics 
savvy individuals stepped in to fill the need and close the gap. This section presents a 
review of literature pertaining to these efforts. 
Human Resources Accounting (HRA) 
Initially developed by accounting theorists, HRA began as an effort to address the 
value of HC to an organization and as a managerial tool (Flamholtz, Bullen, & Wei, 
2002). HRA has seen its popularity grow and wane over the last five decades (Flamholtz 
et al., 2002). 
HRA measures the Human Capital (HC) within an organization. It treats HC as an 
asset and quantifies the value of the asset in terms of an individual’s intelligence, skills, 




This model provides input for managerial and financial decisions (Mahmudul Hoque, 
2010). Similar to the valuation of equipment or other assets within the company, HRA 
considers “the historical, acquisition, replacement, or opportunity cost of human assets 
(Bontis et al., 1999, p. 393).” HRA has three major function (Flamholtz et al., 2002): 
 Provides numerical information about the cost and value of people to an 
organization; 
 Serves as an analytical framework to facilitate decision making; and 
 Motivates decision-makers to adopt a human-resources perspective. 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 
As with HRA discussed in the previous subsection., Kaplan and Norton designed 
BSC to function as both a means to calculate knowledge within an organization but also 
to facilitate the decision making process (Bontis et al., 1999). BSC tracks numerous 
dimensions within an organization in a systematic way. 
BSC was developed from a multi-year, multi-company study sponsored by 
Harvard Business School (Bontis et al., 1999). Unlike some of the other models 
discussed, BSC includes factors both internal and external to the organization (Bontis et 
al., 1999; Moore, Rowe, & Widener, 2001). 
The authors intended the model to challenge organizations to reinterpret the 
vision for the business as well as the business’ long-term strategy in terms of four 
specific perspectives (Bontis et al., 1999). In order to accomplish this reinterpretation, the 
authors intended top management to communicate across organizational units and 
develop aligned strategies for the entire organization, and to communicate these new 
strategies to all levels of the organization. 
Kaplan and Norton recommend four specific perspectives for measurement: (1) 
financial perspective which includes traditional accounting; (2) customer perspective 
which takes a marketing styled approach toward those groups that the organization 
targets for its services; (3) internal business which focuses on the concept of the value 
chain; and (4) learning and growth which includes measurements related to employees 
and the systems the company has in place to facilitate learning and knowledge sharing 




Intellectual Capital (IC) 
Although termed as capital there is nothing in IC that encompasses the 
conventional concept from economics or accounting (Kim, Yoo, & Lee, 2011). Kim, 
et.al. describe it as a “non-monetary asset without physical substance that can reap 
economic benefit (Kim et al., 2011, p. 2244).” IC is composed of HC, Organizational 
Capital (OC), and Customer Capital (CC). 
In addition to what was previously discussed, Kim, et.al. notes that another 
driving force in HC relates to employees’ commitment to the organization’s mission and 
their satisfaction with the role that they fill within the organization. Bontis maintains that 
this is a source of creativity and innovation (Bontis et al., 1999). 
 
OC is comprised of the organization’s routines and processes which give it its 
competitive advantage. Management philosophy, culture, and information technology 
contribute to OC as well (Kim et al., 2011). 
CC refers to the organization’s relationships within the market. Of these three 
components, CC has the most direct effect on the company’s value and performance 
(Kim et al., 2011). In its comparison of several other research efforts into IC, Kim et.al. 
determined that there are multiple dimensions which contribute to the valuation of IC 
within an organization and that each of those dimensions has numerous sub-dimensions 
which contribute to each. Several of which were outlined above. 
Skandia’s model used 91 IC metrics in addition to 73 traditional metrics to 
calculate the company’s IC assets (Bontis, 2001). When they standardized the model to 
create a universal IC report, the number of metrics expanded to 112 (Bontis, 2001). 
Economic Value Added™ (EVA™) 
As a knowledge measurement, EVA™ (hereafter referred to as EVA which is a 
registered trademark) is a tool closely related to the financial concept of Residual Income 
(RI) (Bontis et al., 1999; Ryan, 2011). RI is the value remaining in an organization after 
all other capital investors’ have been compensated and other factors have been accounted 




of benchmarking the value-creation of intangible assets. Proper knowledge management 
will also increase EVA within the company (Bontis et al., 1999).  
Stern Stewart and Company developed EVA in the late 1980s as a “tool to assist 
corporations to pursue their prime financial directive [and aid] in maximizing the wealth 
of their shareholders (Bontis et al., 1999, p. 394).” However, the concept was by no 
means revolutionary. In the 1920s, General Motors applied the concept of RI to measure 
the performance of divisions within the company (Bontis et al., 1999; Ryan, 2011). 
Ryan identifies three reasons for the adjustments that differentiate EVA from RI: 
 “To convert from accrual to cash accounting. Investors are interested in cash 
flows, so many of the accounting adjustments made, such as allowances for 
doubtful debt, should be eliminated (Ryan, 2011, p. 3)” 
 “Spending on ‘market building’ items such as research, staff training and 
advertising costs should be capitalised [sic] to the extent that they have not 
been in the financial statements (Ryan, 2011, p. 3).” 
 All items of profit and expenditure should be included (Ryan, 2011). 
This concludes the brief overviews of the business world’s most common 
knowledge management systems.  
Recommended Solution for Measuring APT Knowledge 
The ontology developed in the present research along with any modifications and 
expansions in previous sections of this chapter provides an excellent template for 
measuring the knowledge collected about individual APTs and about the APT domain. 
The next subsection makes a general suggestion regarding any scoring method that might 
be employed. The second and third subsections look at a simple and weighted scoring 
approach. 
When intelligence about an APT is discovered through link analysis they should 
be treated as ‘unverified.’ Therefore, the same weight should not be applied to these data 
points as to documented data points as this could potentially bias the research and skew 
the final score of each APT and the overall results of the study. 
Therefore, the recommendation would be to modify whatever score is given to 




documented proof that an inferred data point is accurate, and thus verified, the modifier 
should then be removed and the APT’s scorecard adjusted accordingly. 
Basic Scoring Approach 
These attributes may have a one-to-one or many-to-one relationship within the 
vertical relationships of the ontology. Meaning there may be more than one data point for 
each attribute for a given APT or there may be none. 
As an example of the many-to-one relationship, a given APT could employ 
multiple means of delivery in order to inject the APT into a target network (e.g., 
removable media, email attachment, malicious site, etc.). Knowing each of those means 
of delivery means that there are more data known about a given threat. Therefore, each 
data point should be counted individually when scoring each APT. 
Weighted Scoring Approach 
The compelling thought supporting such a scoring methodology rested in the 
concept that some data points would be more useful for IDS and IPS detection. The 
researcher even considered different ways to rank the importance of different data points 
including surveying a subset of the cybersecurity profession with emphasis on experience 
with APT detection. 
A weighted scoring system certainly has a place in further research where one 
places a value upon the ‘usefulness’ of data based on detection criteria. Should future 
research delve into the application of threat intelligence for APT detection, then 
modifiers based on the usefulness of the data should be employed. 
Apply the Ontology to Support Cyber Resiliency 
Within the last three years, MITRE and NIST have developed cyber resiliency 
models with the goal of enabling organizations to build resiliency into their IT and 
business infrastructure and to address ongoing threats like APTs. As the goal of these 
methodologies is to ensure the survival and rapid recovery of the entire business, the 




properly integrate IT risk management plans within the risk management plans for the 
business and support the application of the Cyber Resiliency methodologies. 
The use of an ontology in work like risk management and resiliency planning 
would reduce the time it takes to develop and implement plans. It would facilitate 
improved communications and effectiveness of training. Ultimately, should the need 
arise, the execution of these plans could be done more smoothly both because of the 
common language and the increased knowledge that the ontology could provide. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we examined the purpose and significance of the present study. 
We also reviewed the methodology and critiqued its design. After the critique was 
concluded, a series of further research efforts were recommended in order to make use of 
the work begun here. The recommendations for further research include the expansion of 
the ontology through expanded search for new content and the integration of applicable 
ontologies available in the public domain. Further recommendations were made, which 
involved the use of inferential analysis and a means for measuring the amount of 
knowledge possessed about both the domain and individual APTs by applying tools and 
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APPENDIX A. CORPUS STATISTICS 
The data in this appendix represents the comparison of key document characteristics both in their base form (0 words 



































1 2,032 390 161 614 368 661 380 8 7 801 680 
2 26,071 4,093 1,012 2,590 1,552 2,996 1,611 12 12 14,314 6,652 
3 3,652 790 77 926 397 1,046 412 11 10 2,077 708 
4 1,648 150 20 480 130 543 133 10 8 1,199 279 
5 1,940 301 43 578 266 626 270 12 10 1,078 518 
6 1,549 209 24 506 200 540 204 10 8 979 337 
7 604 72 14 285 106 312 108 7 7 404 114 
8 5,024 349 155 791 383 880 393 10 9 3,272 1,248 
9 1,308 226 105 421 198 445 198 10 8 638 339 
10 3,904 532 5 481 173 548 182 10 8 2,491 876 
11 1,024 117 18 363 109 408 114 7 6 694 195 
12 829 98 13 340 154 369 156 10 9 497 221 
13 21,124 2,078 326 2,975 1,446 3,552 1,511 12 12 14,571 4,149 
14 3,190 359 45 851 344 928 353 8 8 2,057 729 
15 2,288 262 37 775 325 850 335 13 11 1,428 561 
16 3,541 786 191 865 452 935 454 12 10 1,655 909 
17 2,392 515 177 649 435 685 449 9 8 742 958 
18 4,055 857 521 782 432 856 449 12 11 1,426 1,251 









































21 1,911 211 29 708 295 759 302 10 9 1,227 444 
22 5,151 1,140 156 1,205 654 1,330 669 11 10 2,349 1,506 
23 12,056 1,459 209 1,972 1,105 2,335 1,164 11 10 7,355 3,033 
24 6,086 862 72 1,333 571 1,504 581 11 8 3,820 1,332 
25 3,903 527 127 971 429 1,073 443 9 8 2,302 947 
26 3,758 444 128 728 336 846 360 11 8 2,228 958 
27 6,523 875 127 1,314 769 1,476 787 13 11 3,581 1,940 
28 1,652 170 31 638 259 676 258 9 9 1,077 374 
29 1,683 239 18 566 244 620 247 12 10 994 432 
30 1,998 240 50 638 254 705 262 11 10 1,246 462 
31 2,655 630 59 675 341 754 355 8 7 1,241 725 
32 1,713 190 15 576 213 635 224 9 8 1,117 391 
33 2,454 331 114 608 283 655 284 11 9 1,287 722 
34 2,466 500 17 813 452 883 458 11 10 1,200 749 
35 1,694 172 8 561 235 634 248 10 8 1,157 357 
36 629 63 3 278 80 302 79 7 7 467 96 
37 2,748 355 50 695 269 791 280 11 9 1,784 559 
38 5,934 935 250 1,310 598 1,475 608 10 9 3,474 1,275 
39 7,853 1,281 106 1,188 332 1,441 357 11 10 5,629 837 
40 1,756 389 58 486 174 543 190 10 10 1,003 306 
41 3,914 450 39 944 391 1,087 404 11 9 2,532 893 
42 2,832 619 61 885 548 965 558 12 10 1,357 795 
43 5,959 920 99 1,552 907 1,707 930 12 11 3,102 1,838 
44 24,136 3,713 1,249 3,252 1,761 3,763 1,814 13 13 13,280 5,894 









































46 15,089 1,955 192 2,505 1,438 2,867 1,481 13 11 9,070 3,872 
47 6,557 989 74 1,453 672 1,654 698 10 8 4,152 1,342 
48 1,375 150 11 466 166 516 174 10 8 910 304 
49 8,725 1,033 193 1,892 1,045 2,108 1,058 11 9 5,011 2,488 
50 15,630 1,856 492 2,277 1,272 2,629 1,324 12 12 9,365 3,917 
51 1,558 203 43 511 220 569 229 10 10 944 368 
52 1,755 257 45 617 294 686 300 11 9 1,001 452 
53 2,662 592 59 690 352 746 356 12 11 1,243 768 
54 3,438 553 96 968 495 1,085 512 10 9 1,931 858 
55 3,260 365 153 787 290 850 297 11 9 2,139 603 
56 1,338 158 6 500 186 553 190 10 8 919 255 
57 7,315 1,486 146 1,303 681 1,485 713 12 11 3,762 1,921 
59 1,066 192 16 402 224 419 223 7 7 475 383 
60 3,341 624 67 982 544 1,079 565 11 11 1,639 1,011 
61 2,731 550 58 707 307 780 320 12 11 1,523 600 
62 3,810 475 28 864 407 997 426 10 9 2,317 990 
63 705 150 9 287 125 302 125 6 6 367 179 
64 687 75 15 232 85 253 87 9 7 420 177 
65 3,913 526 107 814 371 922 383 11 11 2,401 879 
66 8,569 1,773 244 1,697 1,060 1,891 1,097 12 11 4,190 2,362 
67 9,526 1,738 293 1,421 811 1,587 837 11 10 4,237 3,258 
68 3,785 836 63 789 360 875 368 11 9 2,129 757 
69 5,399 635 72 1,223 485 1,394 497 11 8 3,594 1,098 
70 3,016 566 32 907 473 1,000 488 12 11 1,689 729 









































72 3,476 479 39 842 373 957 384 13 12 2,063 895 
73 5,726 1,173 135 1,267 671 1,452 695 12 11 3,014 1,404 
74 2,349 277 75 600 274 671 280 10 10 1,427 570 
75 3,166 603 94 808 468 888 481 10 10 1,443 1,026 
76 11,325 1,553 242 2,075 1,114 2,417 1,161 12 11 6,784 2,746 
77 3,655 791 77 928 399 1,048 414 11 10 2,077 710 
78 1,273 153 43 431 185 479 194 10 9 750 327 
79 9,372 2,330 400 1,517 865 1,705 895 11 11 4,238 2,404 
80 1,553 145 13 588 229 641 234 10 10 1,013 382 
81 3,161 343 85 929 430 1,027 445 11 9 1,951 782 
82 2,788 457 44 811 369 894 378 10 10 1,615 672 
83 14,648 1,913 192 2,469 1,422 2,821 1,461 13 11 8,697 3,846 
85 5,550 998 220 1,157 564 1,283 577 11 10 2,783 1,549 
86 3,383 784 190 849 437 921 441 12 10 1,581 828 
87 3,682 371 44 956 304 1,111 318 11 8 2,666 601 
88 11,070 1,962 179 1,939 1,039 2,209 1,063 12 10 6,108 2,821 
89 4,166 823 129 898 390 1,006 399 11 10 2,365 849 
90 7,471 896 129 1,457 554 1,726 576 12 10 5,130 1,316 
91 2,889 535 38 826 406 912 417 12 12 1,622 694 
92 5,530 1,138 115 1,253 677 1,374 697 10 10 2,851 1,426 
93 1,978 210 50 446 135 506 136 9 8 1,393 325 
94 2,038 331 49 656 275 724 283 11 10 1,187 471 
95 4,601 1,189 100 855 360 982 373 13 12 2,531 781 
96 9,034 1,212 233 1,624 772 1,867 803 12 10 5,458 2,131 









































98 2,044 148 73 749 358 819 367 10 9 1,271 552 
99 9,412 1,505 278 1,927 996 2,217 1,039 10 10 5,315 2,314 
100 1,579 261 71 471 234 520 241 11 10 823 424 
101 7,645 1,493 175 1,620 970 1,782 995 12 11 3,578 2,399 
102 3,230 370 13 796 230 928 245 13 11 2,420 427 
103 4,631 723 88 1,014 431 1,145 441 10 10 2,860 960 
104 3,732 388 99 887 523 978 532 10 8 1,997 1,248 
105 4,522 1,154 274 842 435 923 448 12 11 1,905 1,189 
106 3,548 494 55 980 478 1,078 486 11 11 2,116 883 
107 7,402 1,477 380 1,393 720 1,588 745 11 10 4,110 1,435 
108 1,423 229 21 458 178 506 185 9 7 820 353 
109 3,369 411 64 783 369 888 386 12 11 2,015 879 
110 10,053 1,600 257 1,635 863 1,883 896 13 11 5,913 2,283 
111 1,924 187 62 632 287 691 294 10 9 1,198 477 
112 17,694 3,892 864 2,560 1,654 2,877 1,715 13 11 7,673 5,265 
113 5,743 940 134 1,194 528 1,344 540 12 11 3,385 1,284 
114 7,902 1,622 155 1,476 875 1,656 907 13 12 3,735 2,390 
115 11,883 1,815 267 2,084 1,146 2,383 1,180 13 11 6,638 3,163 
116 4,596 948 84 826 430 894 432 10 9 2,247 1,317 
117 804 90 15 336 104 362 108 8 6 528 171 
118 9,910 1,903 337 1,874 1,165 2,134 1,206 12 11 5,119 2,551 
119 1,505 140 5 529 188 576 194 10 10 1,009 351 
120 743 201 23 279 146 301 153 8 7 313 206 
121 2,419 336 265 585 296 652 311 9 8 1,209 609 









































123 3,423 497 88 1,016 502 1,117 510 11 10 2,020 818 
124 1,954 1,131 49 344 293 345 292 8 7 188 586 
125 8,038 1,011 89 1,472 788 1,685 820 12 11 4,714 2,224 
126 14,378 2,373 479 2,067 1,158 2,377 1,197 13 13 8,099 3,427 
127 4,901 678 296 1,176 538 1,324 552 12 10 2,776 1,151 
128 13,587 3,046 897 2,511 1,838 2,711 1,867 12 11 4,835 4,809 
129 3,404 723 153 963 583 1,056 596 12 11 1,424 1,104 
130 6,255 585 160 1,151 439 1,324 463 11 9 4,355 1,155 
131 1,474 250 60 531 265 570 271 9 8 736 428 
132 1,052 114 7 358 167 393 170 9 9 686 245 
133 4,173 927 66 1,120 649 1,217 671 12 12 1,890 1,290 
134 1,530 197 41 503 242 554 250 10 10 886 406 
135 2,732 1,013 57 643 438 660 439 8 8 763 899 
137 6,277 836 258 1,252 661 1,391 672 12 11 3,578 1,605 
138 2,414 329 58 571 190 634 192 10 9 1,669 358 
139 5,090 803 144 937 378 1,082 399 11 9 3,026 1,117 
140 410 43 2 219 81 230 81 6 5 266 99 
141 6,289 693 88 1,220 526 1,430 561 13 12 4,091 1,417 
143 3,377 304 263 836 258 923 264 11 10 2,295 515 
144 11,622 3,605 727 4,075 3,619 4,183 3,629 12 11 2,367 4,923 
145 1,636 267 41 611 335 651 336 9 8 849 479 
146 4,217 839 155 1,614 1,108 1,689 1,117 11 8 1,661 1,562 
147 2,250 298 20 658 199 744 206 11 8 1,539 393 
148 1,712 192 14 536 209 588 216 9 7 1,115 391 









































150 27,122 3,435 1,969 2,809 1,714 3,331 1,802 13 13 16,204 5,514 
151 22,225 5,085 451 3,327 2,241 3,761 2,296 12 11 11,482 5,207 
152 1,347 141 60 411 197 456 208 9 8 663 483 
153 4,100 593 119 985 481 1,089 486 11 11 2,372 1,016 
154 4,227 599 117 979 467 1,088 474 11 11 2,475 1,036 
155 13,570 3,034 897 2,498 1,825 2,698 1,854 12 11 4,835 4,804 
156 1,852 181 53 631 261 700 266 10 10 1,143 475 
157 2,783 412 78 698 311 782 316 11 10 1,683 610 
158 2,835 425 72 674 299 762 305 11 9 1,714 624 
159 6,463 1,125 310 1,354 782 1,508 799 12 10 3,367 1,661 
160 8,085 2,080 225 1,723 1,115 1,871 1,136 13 12 3,122 2,658 
161 773 158 32 371 166 394 168 8 8 416 167 
163 3,686 756 93 862 489 943 507 11 10 1,614 1,223 
164 2,099 258 24 671 254 749 260 12 11 1,384 433 
165 3,842 795 102 944 367 1,072 375 12 10 2,300 645 
167 2,508 222 84 623 258 691 261 10 8 1,506 696 
168 13,800 2,062 418 1,979 1,121 2,282 1,158 12 11 7,975 3,345 
169 15,391 2,627 482 2,179 1,240 2,519 1,282 13 12 8,693 3,589 
170 1,117 149 12 421 140 446 141 9 7 692 264 
171 8,495 1,351 195 1,470 699 1,728 729 10 9 5,196 1,753 
172 393 32 15 220 76 231 77 10 8 268 78 
173 11,846 2,014 1,588 2,151 1,470 2,325 1,504 13 11 4,539 3,705 
174 3,050 445 57 762 257 867 267 10 8 1,967 581 
175 1,434 119 85 619 263 659 268 9 9 931 299 









































177 720 118 10 356 153 377 154 11 9 408 184 
179 1,453 137 19 517 192 575 200 10 9 1,006 291 
180 1,451 145 33 544 239 610 249 9 8 902 371 
181 1,404 140 28 522 229 584 236 9 8 878 358 
182 4,574 820 63 1,151 585 1,281 598 10 8 2,661 1,030 
183 2,717 713 62 675 305 753 315 11 9 1,301 641 
184 5,592 896 137 1,195 651 1,306 658 12 10 3,048 1,511 
185 2,303 221 36 590 172 665 181 10 9 1,647 399 
188 1,858 176 42 608 199 679 206 10 8 1,286 354 
189 2,083 314 53 663 280 724 285 11 10 1,241 475 
190 4,797 576 84 861 391 1,006 415 12 10 2,927 1,210 
191 5,301 772 140 1,062 478 1,202 495 11 10 3,195 1,194 
192 1,373 235 27 502 259 527 258 9 8 649 462 
194 2,697 316 132 811 403 874 406 11 10 1,575 674 
195 2,319 292 70 735 293 808 303 10 9 1,435 522 
196 2,894 257 85 718 256 809 264 12 10 1,935 617 
197 2,556 270 15 795 280 879 288 12 9 1,692 579 
198 2,714 293 100 789 378 850 383 11 10 1,537 784 
199 2,735 303 97 769 361 831 366 11 10 1,541 794 
200 1,582 153 44 572 209 621 215 9 7 981 404 
201 8,790 1,093 208 1,588 829 1,857 867 11 10 5,415 2,074 
202 5,664 1,203 145 1,075 584 1,229 612 12 11 2,915 1,401 
203 2,885 261 45 862 294 984 306 9 8 2,102 477 
204 1,972 169 149 792 328 848 331 10 8 1,141 513 









































206 2,025 271 77 650 316 722 322 11 9 1,149 528 
207 3,300 479 71 717 320 793 322 11 10 2,008 742 
208 1,736 201 47 590 230 651 232 11 10 1,152 336 
209 3,960 458 62 1,182 627 1,331 648 12 10 2,263 1,177 
210 2,650 305 57 632 243 720 260 7 6 1,722 566 
211 2,728 540 85 1,231 1,206 1,232 1,207 9 9 36 2,067 
212 10,413 705 6,124 981 555 1,067 565 12 11 1,775 1,809 
213 2,637 288 45 835 373 941 384 12 11 1,666 638 
214 483 79 6 331 268 333 269 8 8 86 312 
215 14,831 2,940 865 2,539 1,425 2,817 1,447 12 11 6,992 4,034 
216 9,598 2,197 392 1,686 914 1,964 949 11 10 4,867 2,142 
217 1,686 247 84 607 340 645 347 12 11 858 497 
218 4,646 726 481 1,040 548 1,140 557 12 11 2,149 1,290 
219 2,788 861 308 785 507 825 513 10 9 782 837 
220 3,742 829 91 946 469 1,070 487 12 10 1,858 964 
221 953 100 13 395 164 429 167 9 8 595 245 
222 17,639 2,976 471 2,212 1,368 2,555 1,426 13 13 9,735 4,457 
223 23,045 4,549 615 2,758 1,574 3,182 1,635 11 10 12,203 5,678 
224 36,573 5,411 1,179 3,291 2,175 3,824 2,271 13 13 21,541 8,442 
225 27,007 4,316 683 2,444 1,462 2,871 1,531 12 12 15,837 6,171 
226 6,250 1,137 133 1,099 535 1,273 556 12 12 3,500 1,480 
227 15,453 4,717 659 2,886 1,994 3,153 2,047 12 12 5,865 4,212 
228 12,982 1,805 167 1,997 814 2,362 850 12 11 8,913 2,097 
229 5,315 1,083 120 1,064 520 1,199 532 10 9 2,664 1,448 









































231 8,589 1,760 318 1,046 504 1,225 528 11 10 5,023 1,488 
232 5,071 1,006 104 1,009 456 1,132 467 10 9 2,837 1,124 
233 7,144 1,319 172 1,356 705 1,524 718 11 10 3,645 2,008 
234 5,985 942 155 1,129 524 1,309 556 13 11 3,713 1,175 
235 2,643 375 42 797 396 887 406 11 10 1,571 655 
236 2,895 373 69 817 415 904 429 10 7 1,599 854 
237 7,963 1,206 155 1,428 727 1,617 744 10 9 4,604 1,998 
238 1,036 124 16 374 128 409 132 10 9 695 201 
239 3,571 354 224 719 262 827 269 10 8 2,355 638 
240 6,861 822 296 1,556 833 1,745 860 11 10 3,954 1,789 
241 3,411 776 73 1,142 764 1,218 774 11 8 1,507 1,055 
242 2,118 343 106 679 346 738 353 9 9 1,043 626 
243 3,435 424 100 792 344 876 348 11 10 2,140 771 
244 3,115 343 128 730 263 832 272 11 9 2,069 575 
245 3,987 619 172 1,157 633 1,265 649 13 12 2,120 1,076 
246 12,127 1,252 321 2,148 879 2,481 904 13 11 8,781 1,773 
247 4,638 981 71 946 445 1,066 459 11 10 2,562 1,024 
248 8,208 1,858 329 1,088 540 1,252 565 11 8 4,524 1,497 
249 4,689 564 85 931 333 1,086 353 9 8 3,265 775 
250 9,667 1,866 272 1,764 1,167 1,946 1,194 11 10 4,292 3,237 
251 5,448 1,104 155 1,067 530 1,215 550 12 11 2,954 1,235 
252 6,597 778 96 1,330 588 1,505 611 11 10 4,215 1,508 
253 20,407 5,392 2,732 3,532 2,780 3,759 2,815 13 13 6,008 6,275 
254 1,135 297 12 310 157 331 159 6 6 519 307 









































256 1,502 102 4 423 92 484 97 10 9 1,204 192 
257 25,972 3,347 489 3,284 1,807 3,804 1,861 12 12 17,321 4,815 
258 4,219 860 158 1,113 637 1,220 648 11 10 2,010 1,191 
259 3,744 715 111 774 410 872 422 9 7 1,760 1,158 
260 12,315 1,205 218 1,815 760 2,187 798 12 11 8,244 2,648 
261 1,978 458 67 489 239 523 241 10 9 947 506 
262 10,306 1,924 409 1,507 837 1,714 869 12 10 5,267 2,706 
263 16,562 3,633 549 2,498 1,692 2,804 1,748 12 11 7,554 4,826 
264 1,948 223 16 606 192 684 203 10 8 1,340 369 
265 4,254 875 97 856 376 958 386 11 9 2,449 833 
266 1,155 313 12 368 186 383 186 10 10 454 376 
267 2,134 659 30 630 391 676 398 12 12 804 641 
268 1,196 157 33 450 217 490 221 8 8 688 318 
269 13,116 2,181 655 2,156 1,192 2,442 1,240 13 13 6,849 3,431 
270 1,572 222 49 506 249 543 250 9 8 867 434 
271 1,002 111 10 372 108 414 116 10 8 688 193 
272 5,965 932 172 1,121 523 1,282 541 10 9 3,570 1,291 
273 1,385 125 8 473 137 535 145 8 7 1,013 239 
274 6,531 1,320 187 1,310 660 1,491 692 12 10 3,436 1,588 
275 2,407 420 21 757 328 841 341 10 8 1,403 563 
276 2,262 470 48 603 250 675 259 11 10 1,314 430 
277 2,753 365 54 715 331 787 338 13 11 1,621 713 
278 462 46 8 213 67 226 68 6 4 321 87 
279 6,073 1,160 302 1,117 530 1,280 547 11 10 3,297 1,314 









































281 2,842 333 69 772 367 861 377 12 9 1,726 714 
282 14,398 2,140 989 2,572 1,582 2,872 1,641 11 10 7,954 3,315 
283 7,025 1,032 179 997 532 1,128 549 11 10 4,132 1,682 
284 1,043 169 56 386 177 412 176 9 9 553 265 
285 1,854 326 19 611 260 657 270 10 8 1,034 475 
286 21,340 3,527 615 3,326 2,006 3,772 2,074 13 11 12,048 5,150 
287 1,456 437 24 315 156 339 155 11 10 559 436 
288 2,751 472 306 853 468 900 472 11 10 1,189 784 
289 7,219 1,320 268 1,361 666 1,574 693 12 11 4,072 1,559 
290 5,215 583 208 1,006 427 1,149 443 9 8 3,258 1,166 
291 1,102 166 12 384 128 431 129 10 8 739 185 
292 19,246 5,188 422 3,578 3,058 3,678 3,084 13 12 3,447 10,189 
293 5,560 1,296 218 1,146 589 1,274 606 10 10 2,690 1,356 
294 1,353 213 54 424 190 466 193 9 8 798 288 
295 1,999 290 36 548 236 609 242 10 9 1,163 510 
296 17,114 6,239 475 1,349 976 1,413 988 12 11 3,360 7,040 
297 6,193 966 196 1,315 729 1,495 760 12 11 3,442 1,589 
298 1,687 300 33 504 261 558 273 9 8 864 490 
299 1,087 205 6 322 118 348 123 7 6 618 258 
300 2,569 647 29 648 323 719 329 9 6 1,286 607 
301 3,967 720 90 787 401 862 410 10 9 2,011 1,146 
302 2,597 898 22 694 387 750 395 10 9 938 739 
303 1,191 193 8 437 173 479 175 9 7 740 250 
304 6,735 2,178 173 1,171 697 1,297 719 11 10 2,731 1,653 









































306 986 122 24 360 135 403 137 8 8 683 157 
307 1,449 289 59 465 222 512 228 9 8 734 367 
308 1,753 330 18 502 226 548 233 9 8 944 461 
309 2,719 292 17 761 288 876 298 10 9 1,839 571 
311 14,738 2,422 606 2,290 1,273 2,608 1,309 13 12 8,345 3,365 
312 5,703 1,078 132 1,203 666 1,346 691 12 11 2,878 1,615 
313 6,906 1,314 153 1,581 856 1,798 893 12 11 3,662 1,777 
314 7,185 938 218 1,121 528 1,318 560 11 10 4,311 1,718 
315 1,035 144 9 332 118 377 127 8 8 679 203 
316 1,180 103 21 448 159 496 163 10 8 811 245 
317 3,484 710 123 1,063 586 1,135 595 10 8 1,720 931 
318 1,222 163 58 436 198 483 208 8 8 729 272 
320 11,947 2,291 548 1,862 1,112 2,077 1,140 12 12 5,798 3,310 
321 14,074 2,530 979 2,444 1,603 2,758 1,653 12 12 6,712 3,853 
322 14,041 2,509 191 1,836 1,041 2,090 1,073 11 9 7,496 3,845 
323 13,300 4,883 912 2,200 1,721 2,305 1,730 12 12 2,726 4,779 
324 2,187 216 14 602 244 698 261 11 11 1,502 455 
325 2,642 448 103 688 393 742 399 10 9 1,269 822 
326 7,905 1,245 148 1,339 520 1,578 544 10 10 5,178 1,334 
327 3,912 583 173 913 476 984 487 11 10 2,071 1,085 
328 1,290 282 24 397 182 437 184 9 8 732 252 
329 1,520 180 16 616 313 658 316 11 11 874 450 
330 5,268 1,534 209 901 528 991 544 12 12 1,926 1,599 
331 4,684 750 42 853 414 981 433 11 11 2,658 1,234 









































333 1,110 131 50 461 254 489 256 10 9 611 318 
334 4,883 942 105 1,197 715 1,323 741 12 11 2,443 1,393 
335 509 297 14 183 154 184 155 2 2 38 160 
336 1,042 136 9 372 129 417 135 7 6 679 218 
337 3,369 442 142 781 396 876 408 11 10 1,820 965 
338 1,849 243 45 597 278 673 287 9 9 1,096 465 
339 1,522 258 7 481 191 550 196 8 7 872 385 
340 918 111 3 375 143 403 145 8 6 613 191 
341 6,050 886 306 1,019 446 1,185 464 11 10 3,484 1,374 
342 2,765 299 28 695 264 787 273 10 8 1,849 589 
343 715 114 2 257 93 282 95 7 5 453 146 
344 5,137 612 72 1,121 557 1,288 584 11 10 3,339 1,114 
345 2,321 477 74 670 361 727 369 11 10 1,119 651 
346 10,318 1,297 635 2,390 1,462 2,658 1,498 13 12 6,106 2,280 
347 1,087 147 4 356 115 397 120 9 8 724 212 
348 1,232 102 20 427 157 477 164 9 8 841 269 
349 23,753 3,497 880 4,086 2,532 4,616 2,595 13 12 13,825 5,551 
350 6,306 782 130 1,438 709 1,651 740 12 11 3,880 1,514 
351 5,845 2,096 34 979 551 1,088 560 10 9 2,275 1,440 
352 3,946 885 84 756 297 858 306 11 9 2,351 626 
353 587 110 25 271 191 281 191 10 9 162 290 
354 1,589 189 24 439 148 492 156 11 9 1,055 321 
355 5,857 1,063 52 1,269 586 1,450 600 11 10 3,434 1,308 
356 84,473 39,396 253 1,801 1,102 2,023 1,127 13 13 4,890 39,934 









































358 4,591 1,324 77 863 325 987 339 10 9 2,414 776 
359 3,891 575 40 983 436 1,125 453 12 11 2,410 866 
360 6,634 1,486 185 1,269 675 1,423 690 11 10 3,475 1,488 
361 21,855 4,804 1,198 3,882 2,938 4,183 2,984 13 13 7,942 7,911 
362 7,761 1,879 385 1,471 820 1,639 847 12 12 3,703 1,794 
363 10,581 1,203 175 1,829 724 2,170 756 13 13 7,724 1,479 
364 1,121 162 28 351 144 382 146 10 8 614 317 
365 10,981 2,015 266 1,792 877 2,054 904 13 13 6,446 2,254 
366 836 168 13 310 128 339 131 8 8 465 190 
367 3,835 891 123 1,136 629 1,217 640 10 8 1,822 999 
368 7,112 781 306 1,720 994 1,893 1,005 13 11 4,023 2,002 
369 1,748 179 27 478 137 551 146 10 8 1,248 294 
370 1,616 190 13 561 183 615 185 9 8 1,125 288 
371 1,727 111 92 505 213 549 219 8 8 881 643 
372 3,612 511 24 1,081 576 1,214 591 11 9 2,052 1,025 
373 12,394 2,555 444 2,667 1,676 2,991 1,724 9 9 6,061 3,334 
374 15,194 2,142 1,284 2,644 1,648 2,944 1,708 11 10 8,106 3,662 
375 3,355 684 116 1,010 536 1,085 543 10 8 1,709 846 
376 6,076 798 276 1,227 685 1,362 704 13 13 3,206 1,796 
377 3,024 738 192 678 330 748 339 10 8 1,321 773 
378 1,315 128 28 391 144 436 148 10 8 875 284 
379 9,044 1,225 420 1,787 822 2,047 841 13 11 5,370 2,029 
380 2,495 215 13 625 195 710 207 8 8 1,831 436 
381 16,367 1,780 417 2,277 1,066 2,652 1,098 12 11 10,814 3,356 









































383 10,672 1,846 208 1,752 1,046 1,985 1,081 13 11 5,381 3,237 
384 7,704 2,319 244 1,363 838 1,534 872 11 9 3,414 1,727 
385 2,027 357 36 600 306 653 313 11 10 1,053 581 
386 1,813 388 56 524 251 578 261 11 10 925 444 
387 13,260 3,091 345 1,988 1,442 2,126 1,462 11 10 4,617 5,207 
388 7,181 1,617 157 1,116 464 1,295 478 11 10 4,085 1,322 
389 4,908 1,126 136 1,063 517 1,192 537 11 10 2,606 1,040 
390 1,760 223 50 493 213 545 220 9 8 1,047 440 
392 21,055 2,224 455 3,233 1,715 3,790 1,787 13 12 14,588 3,788 
393 2,069 304 47 753 408 819 424 10 9 1,108 610 
394 3,862 460 91 980 430 1,084 433 11 10 2,373 938 
395 4,836 931 133 1,013 515 1,114 529 12 11 2,539 1,233 
396 4,104 966 50 1,195 685 1,294 696 11 10 1,805 1,283 
397 1,288 202 57 504 257 550 272 10 10 625 404 
398 1,026 176 24 384 188 413 190 11 10 560 266 
399 1,203 190 11 410 163 453 172 8 8 730 272 
400 14,007 5,594 451 1,906 1,355 2,053 1,380 12 12 3,979 3,983 
401 7,545 1,342 139 1,375 622 1,563 644 11 10 4,621 1,443 
402 6,609 1,035 387 1,212 606 1,393 635 11 10 3,586 1,601 
403 7,144 664 723 1,797 1,440 1,867 1,452 10 10 1,609 4,148 
404 7,855 1,325 153 1,700 931 1,903 963 13 12 4,587 1,790 
405 11,064 5,033 243 1,696 1,269 1,782 1,284 12 11 2,597 3,191 
406 8,804 1,440 260 1,530 808 1,758 846 12 10 4,758 2,346 
407 2,883 641 205 905 501 990 512 12 11 1,388 649 









































409 5,214 1,462 128 1,002 513 1,099 526 12 11 2,471 1,153 
411 12,927 2,863 287 2,116 1,371 2,389 1,417 12 11 6,218 3,559 
412 3,751 979 435 710 453 757 457 10 10 1,076 1,261 
413 11,283 1,934 304 1,921 1,181 2,165 1,216 12 12 5,975 3,070 
414 1,485 212 43 446 196 497 204 11 10 897 333 
415 3,494 581 101 902 433 1,004 441 11 11 1,980 832 
416 6,227 904 133 1,323 674 1,484 700 12 10 3,390 1,800 
417 807 88 2 350 114 382 117 8 7 561 156 
419 3,991 657 66 989 510 1,102 522 11 11 2,186 1,082 
420 15,581 5,289 174 3,474 3,160 3,514 3,172 12 10 3,055 7,063 
421 2,274 323 37 616 240 695 255 10 9 1,344 570 
422 3,149 950 193 953 555 1,026 564 13 11 1,289 717 
423 8,693 1,035 297 1,317 580 1,550 602 10 10 5,481 1,880 
424 6,027 1,154 134 1,058 486 1,215 506 11 9 3,642 1,097 
425 1,453 193 102 545 378 575 382 8 8 470 688 
426 727 122 52 388 214 397 214 11 9 302 251 
427 3,918 584 447 1,145 657 1,246 666 11 10 1,815 1,072 
428 12,050 2,530 807 3,720 3,164 3,861 3,190 12 12 3,297 5,416 
429 2,020 279 34 634 298 705 306 10 9 1,220 487 
430 2,607 235 60 811 354 892 362 10 9 1,477 835 
431 3,611 511 14 900 371 1,033 381 11 9 2,338 748 
432 11,357 1,613 424 2,446 1,187 2,737 1,211 12 11 6,542 2,778 
433 2,268 419 58 638 269 718 283 10 9 1,300 491 
434 1,547 171 39 484 208 528 212 10 8 928 409 









































436 2,684 285 31 840 324 924 326 10 9 1,788 580 
437 3,125 431 59 868 366 965 376 9 8 2,053 582 
438 18,718 2,456 382 3,186 2,076 3,623 2,132 13 13 11,109 4,771 
439 26,705 3,555 847 3,293 1,853 3,930 1,930 13 13 16,091 6,212 
440 8,893 2,325 856 1,329 881 1,431 893 10 10 2,428 3,284 








APPENDIX B. FIVE HUNDRED (500) MOST COMMON TOKENS 
 
















cid cid 28 20055 716.2500 47.1882 6.5882 1.0624 
malware malware 404 8487 21.0074 19.9694 95.0588 0.4496 
s ’s 338 6129 18.1331 14.4212 79.5294 0.3247 
datum data 375 4949 13.1973 11.6447 88.2353 0.2622 
server server 341 4128 12.1056 9.7129 80.2353 0.2187 
c C 272 3347 12.3051 7.8753 64.0000 0.1773 
windows Windows 321 2846 8.8660 6.6965 75.5294 0.1508 
s S 227 2549 11.2291 5.9976 53.4118 0.1350 
attacker attackers 295 2539 8.6068 5.9741 69.4118 0.1345 
com com 214 2512 11.7383 5.9106 50.3529 0.1331 
ip IP 292 2440 8.3562 5.7412 68.7059 0.1293 
c2 C2 169 2378 14.0710 5.5953 39.7647 0.1260 
malicious malicious 331 2324 7.0211 5.4682 77.8824 0.1231 
c&c C&C 171 2306 13.4854 5.4259 40.2353 0.1222 
microsoft Microsoft 302 1921 6.3609 4.5200 71.0588 0.1018 
cyber CYBER 209 1865 8.9234 4.3882 49.1765 0.0988 
e E 155 1857 11.9806 4.3694 36.4706 0.0984 
server servers 253 1821 7.1976 4.2847 59.5294 0.0965 
email email 256 1705 6.6602 4.0118 60.2353 0.0903 
dll DLL 206 1649 8.0049 3.8800 48.4706 0.0874 
md5 MD5 242 1608 6.6446 3.7835 56.9412 0.0852 
china China 157 1544 9.8344 3.6329 36.9412 0.0818 
d D 180 1496 8.3111 3.5200 42.3529 0.0792 
payload payload 234 1473 6.2949 3.4659 55.0588 0.0780 























backdoor backdoor 186 1370 7.3656 3.2235 43.7647 0.0726 
byte bytes 188 1292 6.8723 3.0400 44.2353 0.0684 
module module 126 1275 10.1190 3.0000 29.6471 0.0675 
http HTTP 218 1212 5.5596 2.8518 51.2941 0.0642 
o O 93 1207 12.9785 2.8400 21.8824 0.0639 
registry registry 197 1206 6.1218 2.8376 46.3529 0.0639 
infected infected 231 1175 5.0866 2.7647 54.3529 0.0622 
n N 117 1174 10.0342 2.7624 27.5294 0.0622 
b B 153 1089 7.1176 2.5624 36.0000 0.0577 
apt APT 158 1083 6.8544 2.5482 37.1765 0.0574 
attacker attacker 229 1067 4.6594 2.5106 53.8824 0.0565 
r R 116 1024 8.8276 2.4094 27.2941 0.0542 
trojan Trojan 188 1002 5.3298 2.3576 44.2353 0.0531 
binary binary 195 982 5.0359 2.3106 45.8824 0.0520 
executable executable 251 979 3.9004 2.3035 59.0588 0.0519 
t T 109 976 8.9541 2.2965 25.6471 0.0517 
directory directory 191 974 5.0995 2.2918 44.9412 0.0516 
id ID 172 973 5.6570 2.2894 40.4706 0.0515 
appendix Appendix 140 856 6.1143 2.0141 32.9412 0.0453 
website website 216 846 3.9167 1.9906 50.8235 0.0448 
micro Micro 69 825 11.9565 1.9412 16.2353 0.0437 
vulnerability vulnerability 185 810 4.3784 1.9059 43.5294 0.0429 
org org 95 809 8.5158 1.9035 22.3529 0.0429 
detection detection 247 804 3.2551 1.8918 58.1176 0.0426 
functionality functionality 206 795 3.8592 1.8706 48.4706 0.0421 
variant variant 174 795 4.5690 1.8706 40.9412 0.0421 
dropper dropper 135 779 5.7704 1.8329 31.7647 0.0413 
encrypted encrypted 194 777 4.0052 1.8282 45.6471 0.0412 
variant variants 176 768 4.3636 1.8071 41.4118 0.0407 























f F 111 759 6.8378 1.7859 26.1176 0.0402 
exe EXE 180 748 4.1556 1.7600 42.3529 0.0396 
download download 226 747 3.3053 1.7576 53.1765 0.0396 
further further 276 729 2.6413 1.7153 64.9412 0.0386 
url URL 187 719 3.8449 1.6918 44.0000 0.0381 
espionage ESPIONAGE 155 714 4.6065 1.6800 36.4706 0.0378 
temp temp 147 714 4.8571 1.6800 34.5882 0.0378 
korea Korea 63 707 11.2222 1.6635 14.8235 0.0375 
email emails 154 696 4.5195 1.6376 36.2353 0.0369 
decoy Decoy 98 694 7.0816 1.6329 23.0588 0.0368 
filename filename 142 686 4.8310 1.6141 33.4118 0.0363 
hash hash 162 680 4.1975 1.6000 38.1176 0.0360 
l L 75 673 8.9733 1.5835 17.6471 0.0357 
dword dword 60 661 11.0167 1.5553 14.1176 0.0350 
phishing Phishing 127 660 5.1969 1.5529 29.8824 0.0350 
stuxnet stuxnet 30 658 21.9333 1.5482 7.0588 0.0349 
tlp TLP 31 657 21.1935 1.5459 7.2941 0.0348 
p P 88 643 7.3068 1.5129 20.7059 0.0341 
july July 152 636 4.1842 1.4965 35.7647 0.0337 
kaspersky Kaspersky 112 635 5.6696 1.4941 26.3529 0.0336 
symantec Symantec 88 635 7.2159 1.4941 20.7059 0.0336 
compile compiled 125 618 4.9440 1.4541 29.4118 0.0327 
encryption encryption 168 618 3.6786 1.4541 39.5294 0.0327 
blog blog 201 603 3.0000 1.4188 47.2941 0.0319 
m M 85 591 6.9529 1.3906 20.0000 0.0313 
fireeye FireEye 79 582 7.3671 1.3694 18.5882 0.0308 
copyright Copyright 113 580 5.1327 1.3647 26.5882 0.0307 
rights RIGHTS 183 571 3.1202 1.3435 43.0588 0.0302 
google Google 152 563 3.7039 1.3247 35.7647 0.0298 























x X 127 558 4.3937 1.3129 29.8824 0.0296 
pdf PDF 141 549 3.8936 1.2918 33.1765 0.0291 
proxy proxy 132 549 4.1591 1.2918 31.0588 0.0291 
february February 129 543 4.2093 1.2776 30.3529 0.0288 
u U 94 542 5.7660 1.2753 22.1176 0.0287 
website websites 127 536 4.2205 1.2612 29.8824 0.0284 
apt1 APT1 13 519 39.9231 1.2212 3.0588 0.0275 
registrant registrant 67 517 7.7164 1.2165 15.7647 0.0274 
intelreports@kaspersky.com intelreports@kaspersky.com 22 508 23.0909 1.1953 5.1765 0.0269 
module modules 100 508 5.0800 1.1953 23.5294 0.0269 
g G 85 504 5.9294 1.1859 20.0000 0.0267 
april April 138 499 3.6159 1.1741 32.4706 0.0264 
h h 93 496 5.3333 1.1671 21.8824 0.0263 
november November 153 496 3.2418 1.1671 36.0000 0.0263 
plugx PlugX 48 495 10.3125 1.1647 11.2941 0.0262 
cnc CnC 44 491 11.1591 1.1553 10.3529 0.0260 
russia Russia 87 491 5.6437 1.1553 20.4706 0.0260 
folder folder 147 486 3.3061 1.1435 34.5882 0.0257 
dn DNS 132 485 3.6742 1.1412 31.0588 0.0257 
contents contents 198 477 2.4091 1.1224 46.5882 0.0253 
system32 System32 112 469 4.1875 1.1035 26.3529 0.0248 
byte byte 104 466 4.4808 1.0965 24.4706 0.0247 
offset offset 88 466 5.2955 1.0965 20.7059 0.0247 
utc UTC 59 466 7.8983 1.0965 13.8824 0.0247 
india India 80 463 5.7875 1.0894 18.8235 0.0245 
june June 157 458 2.9172 1.0776 36.9412 0.0243 
explorer Explorer 147 456 3.1020 1.0729 34.5882 0.0242 
august August 151 449 2.9735 1.0565 35.5294 0.0238 
fake fake 116 449 3.8707 1.0565 27.2941 0.0238 
























algorithm algorithm 124 446 3.5968 1.0494 29.1765 0.0236 
crowdstrike CrowdStrike 32 445 13.9063 1.0471 7.5294 0.0236 
eax eax 26 444 17.0769 1.0447 6.1176 0.0235 
january January 142 442 3.1127 1.0400 33.4118 0.0234 
loader Loader 77 435 5.6494 1.0235 18.1176 0.0230 
tcp TCP 115 434 3.7739 1.0212 27.0588 0.0230 
certificate certificate 80 425 5.3125 1.0000 18.8235 0.0225 
mov mov 26 416 16.0000 0.9788 6.1176 0.0220 
adversary adversary 70 415 5.9286 0.9765 16.4706 0.0220 
header header 117 415 3.5470 0.9765 27.5294 0.0220 
y Y 70 415 5.9286 0.9765 16.4706 0.0220 
tiger TIGeR 13 413 31.7692 0.9718 3.0588 0.0219 
sha256 SHA256 49 412 8.4082 0.9694 11.5294 0.0218 
pe PE 115 410 3.5652 0.9647 27.0588 0.0217 
rsa rsa 54 407 7.5370 0.9576 12.7059 0.0216 
nt NT 107 405 3.7850 0.9529 25.1765 0.0215 
java java 70 404 5.7714 0.9506 16.4706 0.0214 
php php 75 404 5.3867 0.9506 17.6471 0.0214 
october October 149 403 2.7047 0.9482 35.0588 0.0213 
u.s. U.S. 98 403 4.1122 0.9482 23.0588 0.0213 
duqu Duqu 19 401 21.1053 0.9435 4.4706 0.0212 
info Info 128 401 3.1328 0.9435 30.1176 0.0212 
zero-day Zero-Day 82 399 4.8659 0.9388 19.2941 0.0211 
compile COMPILE 79 397 5.0253 0.9341 18.5882 0.0210 
located located 171 396 2.3158 0.9318 40.2353 0.0210 
buffer buffer 74 395 5.3378 0.9294 17.4118 0.0209 
ff FF 35 394 11.2571 0.9271 8.2353 0.0209 
vulnerability vulnerabilities 135 393 2.9111 0.9247 31.7647 0.0208 
botnet botnet 56 387 6.9107 0.9106 13.1765 0.0205 
























states States 150 387 2.5800 0.9106 35.2941 0.0205 
encode encoded 146 385 2.6370 0.9059 34.3529 0.0204 
shellcode shellcode 82 385 4.6951 0.9059 19.2941 0.0204 
september September 139 384 2.7626 0.9035 32.7059 0.0203 
adobe Adobe 109 375 3.4404 0.8824 25.6471 0.0199 
attribution Attribution 104 373 3.5865 0.8776 24.4706 0.0198 
appdata APPDATA 75 370 4.9333 0.8706 17.6471 0.0196 
ukraine Ukraine 47 369 7.8511 0.8682 11.0588 0.0195 
int int 46 367 7.9783 0.8635 10.8235 0.0194 
api API 98 361 3.6837 0.8494 23.0588 0.0191 
plugin plugin 68 361 5.3088 0.8494 16.0000 0.0191 
currentversion CurrentVersion 114 360 3.1579 0.8471 26.8235 0.0191 
mcafee McAfee 58 357 6.1552 0.8400 13.6471 0.0189 
persistence persistence 135 351 2.6000 0.8259 31.7647 0.0186 
installer installer 75 347 4.6267 0.8165 17.6471 0.0184 
spear spear 100 347 3.4700 0.8165 23.5294 0.0184 
iran Iran 55 345 6.2727 0.8118 12.9412 0.0183 
accord according 147 343 2.3333 0.8071 34.5882 0.0182 
default default 131 343 2.6183 0.8071 30.8235 0.0182 
parameter Parameters 115 341 2.9652 0.8024 27.0588 0.0181 
targeting targeting 116 341 2.9397 0.8024 27.2941 0.0181 
december December 126 340 2.6984 0.8000 29.6471 0.0180 
embedded embedded 135 340 2.5185 0.8000 31.7647 0.0180 
download downloaded 152 339 2.2303 0.7976 35.7647 0.0180 
encrypt encrypted 144 336 2.3333 0.7906 33.8824 0.0178 
html HTML 127 336 2.6457 0.7906 29.8824 0.0178 
hacking Hacking 104 334 3.2115 0.7859 24.4706 0.0177 
upload upload 128 332 2.5938 0.7812 30.1176 0.0176 
browser browser 116 331 2.8534 0.7788 27.2941 0.0175 
























panda Panda 35 328 9.3714 0.7718 8.2353 0.0174 
tibetan Tibetan 36 328 9.1111 0.7718 8.4706 0.0174 
delete delete 124 327 2.6371 0.7694 29.1765 0.0173 
clr CLR 33 326 9.8788 0.7671 7.7647 0.0173 
hash HASHES 128 325 2.5391 0.7647 30.1176 0.0172 
attachment attachment 116 324 2.7931 0.7624 27.2941 0.0172 
node node 32 322 10.0625 0.7576 7.5294 0.0171 
os OS 101 321 3.1782 0.7553 23.7647 0.0170 
username username 94 321 3.4149 0.7553 22.1176 0.0170 
antivirus AntiVirus 122 319 2.6148 0.7506 28.7059 0.0169 
bot bot 53 319 6.0189 0.7506 12.4706 0.0169 
downloader Downloader 62 319 5.1452 0.7506 14.5882 0.0169 
v V 77 315 4.0909 0.7412 18.1176 0.0167 
e.g. e.g. 103 314 3.0485 0.7388 24.2353 0.0166 
identifier identifier 85 313 3.6824 0.7365 20.0000 0.0166 
services Services 117 312 2.6667 0.7341 27.5294 0.0165 
persistent persistent 144 310 2.1528 0.7294 33.8824 0.0164 
screenshot screenshot 106 310 2.9245 0.7294 24.9412 0.0164 
inc. Inc. 62 305 4.9194 0.7176 14.5882 0.0162 
blackenergy BlackEnergy 17 301 17.7059 0.7082 4.0000 0.0159 
hong Hong 64 300 4.6875 0.7059 15.0588 0.0159 
hxxp hxxp 53 300 5.6604 0.7059 12.4706 0.0159 
parameter parameter 94 299 3.1809 0.7035 22.1176 0.0158 
http/1 HTTP/1 80 295 3.6875 0.6941 18.8235 0.0156 
twitter Twitter 73 294 4.0274 0.6918 17.1765 0.0156 
sav SAV 5 293 58.6000 0.6894 1.1765 0.0155 
kong Kong 65 292 4.4923 0.6871 15.2941 0.0155 
packrat Packrat 2 292 146.0000 0.6871 0.4706 0.0155 
exploitation exploitation 113 291 2.5752 0.6847 26.5882 0.0154 
























8b 8b 23 289 12.5652 0.6800 5.4118 0.0153 
blockbuster BLOCKBUSTER 6 288 48.0000 0.6776 1.4118 0.0153 
desktop desktop 97 288 2.9691 0.6776 22.8235 0.0153 
backdoor backdoors 69 287 4.1594 0.6753 16.2353 0.0152 
naikon NAIKON 9 287 31.8889 0.6753 2.1176 0.0152 
taiwan Taiwan 79 287 3.6329 0.6753 18.5882 0.0152 
hacker hackers 72 285 3.9583 0.6706 16.9412 0.0151 
gh0st gh0st 36 284 7.8889 0.6682 8.4706 0.0150 
hklm HKLM 60 284 4.7333 0.6682 14.1176 0.0150 
startup Startup 103 284 2.7573 0.6682 24.2353 0.0150 
archive archive 95 283 2.9789 0.6659 22.3529 0.0150 
kernel kernel 62 280 4.5161 0.6588 14.5882 0.0148 
plugin plugins 55 280 5.0909 0.6588 12.9412 0.0148 
apus API 80 279 3.4875 0.6565 18.8235 0.0148 
registration REGISTRATION 93 276 2.9677 0.6494 21.8824 0.0146 
timer Timer 13 276 21.2308 0.6494 3.0588 0.0146 
backspace BACKSPACE 7 274 39.1429 0.6447 1.6471 0.0145 
doc DOC 90 274 3.0444 0.6447 21.1765 0.0145 
earlier earlier 152 274 1.8026 0.6447 35.7647 0.0145 
vector Vector 121 274 2.2645 0.6447 28.4706 0.0145 
x00 x00 25 274 10.9600 0.6447 5.8824 0.0145 
latest latest 144 273 1.8958 0.6424 33.8824 0.0145 
base64 Base64 95 272 2.8632 0.6400 22.3529 0.0144 
k K 65 271 4.1692 0.6376 15.2941 0.0144 
sha1 SHA1 70 271 3.8714 0.6376 16.4706 0.0144 
aurora AURORA 27 270 10.0000 0.6353 6.3529 0.0143 
spear-phishing spear-phishing 88 268 3.0455 0.6306 20.7059 0.0142 
de de 76 267 3.5132 0.6282 17.8824 0.0141 
hostname hostname 75 267 3.5600 0.6282 17.6471 0.0141 
























password passwords 103 267 2.5922 0.6282 24.2353 0.0141 
gmt GMT 42 266 6.3333 0.6259 9.8824 0.0141 
6f 6f 23 264 11.4783 0.6212 5.4118 0.0140 
regin Regin 13 264 20.3077 0.6212 3.0588 0.0140 
additionally Additionally 119 263 2.2101 0.6188 28.0000 0.0139 
poison Poison 45 261 5.8000 0.6141 10.5882 0.0138 
decrypt decrypted 118 260 2.2034 0.6118 27.7647 0.0138 
lazarus Lazarus 6 260 43.3333 0.6118 1.4118 0.0138 
cc cc 44 259 5.8864 0.6094 10.3529 0.0137 
theft Theft 93 257 2.7634 0.6047 21.8824 0.0136 
binary binaries 101 256 2.5347 0.6024 23.7647 0.0136 
inquire inquire 5 256 51.2000 0.6024 1.1765 0.0136 
user-agent User-Agent 87 256 2.9425 0.6024 20.4706 0.0136 
w w 74 256 3.4595 0.6024 17.4118 0.0136 
z Z 56 255 4.5536 0.6000 13.1765 0.0135 
authentication Authentication 90 253 2.8111 0.5953 21.1765 0.0134 
ivy Ivy 43 253 5.8837 0.5953 10.1176 0.0134 
timeline timeline 94 253 2.6915 0.5953 22.1176 0.0134 
ukrainian Ukrainian 21 252 12.0000 0.5929 4.9412 0.0133 
compilation compilation 77 251 3.2597 0.5906 18.1176 0.0133 
file file 33 251 7.6061 0.5906 7.7647 0.0133 
ip IPs 98 251 2.5612 0.5906 23.0588 0.0133 
miniduke MiniDuke 19 251 13.2105 0.5906 4.4706 0.0133 
carbanak Carbanak 6 250 41.6667 0.5882 1.4118 0.0132 
debug debug 77 250 3.2468 0.5882 18.1176 0.0132 
interface interface 96 249 2.5938 0.5859 22.5882 0.0132 
intrusion intrusion 93 249 2.6774 0.5859 21.8824 0.0132 
attachment attachments 100 248 2.4800 0.5835 23.5294 0.0131 
ca CA 88 247 2.8068 0.5812 20.7059 0.0131 
























cybersecurity cybersecurity 66 247 3.7424 0.5812 15.5294 0.0131 
virustotal VirusTotal 85 246 2.8941 0.5788 20.0000 0.0130 
decryption decryption 87 245 2.8161 0.5765 20.4706 0.0130 
decrypt decrypt 101 243 2.4059 0.5718 23.7647 0.0129 
url URLs 80 243 3.0375 0.5718 18.8235 0.0129 
64-bit 64-bit 58 242 4.1724 0.5694 13.6471 0.0128 
firewall Firewall 78 239 3.0641 0.5624 18.3529 0.0127 
fidelis Fidelis 12 238 19.8333 0.5600 2.8235 0.0126 
syrian Syrian 20 237 11.8500 0.5576 4.7059 0.0126 
cozyduke CozyDuke 6 236 39.3333 0.5553 1.4118 0.0125 
infect infect 107 236 2.2056 0.5553 25.1765 0.0125 
mbr MBR 15 236 15.7333 0.5553 3.5294 0.0125 
rootkit rootkit 51 235 4.6078 0.5529 12.0000 0.0124 
compatible compatible 77 234 3.0390 0.5506 18.1176 0.0124 
usa USA 64 234 3.6563 0.5506 15.0588 0.0124 
windir WINDIR 34 234 6.8824 0.5506 8.0000 0.0124 
msie MSIE 69 233 3.3768 0.5482 16.2353 0.0123 
ebp ebp 20 231 11.5500 0.5435 4.7059 0.0122 
timestamp timestamp 79 230 2.9114 0.5412 18.5882 0.0122 
retrieve retrieved 59 228 3.8644 0.5365 13.8824 0.0121 
ecx ecx 22 227 10.3182 0.5341 5.1765 0.0120 
gen Gen 12 227 18.9167 0.5341 2.8235 0.0120 
implant implant 48 227 4.7292 0.5341 11.2941 0.0120 
n/a n/a 38 227 5.9737 0.5341 8.9412 0.0120 
vpn VPN 53 227 4.2830 0.5341 12.4706 0.0120 
rc4 RC4 66 226 3.4242 0.5318 15.5294 0.0120 
sha-256 SHA-256 18 225 12.5000 0.5294 4.2353 0.0119 
configure configured 97 223 2.2990 0.5247 22.8235 0.0118 
asia Asia 88 222 2.5227 0.5224 20.7059 0.0118 
























mutex mutex 80 222 2.7750 0.5224 18.8235 0.0118 
infect infected 101 220 2.1782 0.5176 23.7647 0.0117 
download downloads 119 219 1.8403 0.5153 28.0000 0.0116 
gif gif 26 219 8.4231 0.5153 6.1176 0.0116 
cybercrime CybERCRImE 61 218 3.5738 0.5129 14.3529 0.0115 
apt30 APT30 4 217 54.2500 0.5106 0.9412 0.0115 
inject injected 86 217 2.5233 0.5106 20.2353 0.0115 
linux Linux 47 217 4.6170 0.5106 11.0588 0.0115 
overview Overview 110 217 1.9727 0.5106 25.8824 0.0115 
payload payloads 86 217 2.5233 0.5106 20.2353 0.0115 
rar RAR 67 217 3.2388 0.5106 15.7647 0.0115 
intel InTel 49 216 4.4082 0.5082 11.5294 0.0114 
advisory advisory 31 214 6.9032 0.5035 7.2941 0.0113 
6c 6c 30 213 7.1000 0.5012 7.0588 0.0113 
login login 103 213 2.0680 0.5012 24.2353 0.0113 
av AV 73 212 2.9041 0.4988 17.1765 0.0112 
injection injection 67 212 3.1642 0.4988 15.7647 0.0112 
var VAR 22 211 9.5909 0.4965 5.1765 0.0112 
fa fA 27 210 7.7778 0.4941 6.3529 0.0111 
japan Japan 74 209 2.8243 0.4918 17.4118 0.0111 
hardcoded hardcoded 87 208 2.3908 0.4894 20.4706 0.0110 
threatconnect ThreatConnect 12 207 17.2500 0.4871 2.8235 0.0110 
controller controller 36 206 5.7222 0.4847 8.4706 0.0109 
reconnaissance reconnaissance 79 206 2.6076 0.4847 18.5882 0.0109 
soft@hotmail.com soft@hotmail.com 1 206 206.0000 0.4847 0.2353 0.0109 
destructive destructive 33 205 6.2121 0.4824 7.7647 0.0109 
trademark trademarks 86 205 2.3837 0.4824 20.2353 0.0109 
xxx XXX 15 205 13.6667 0.4824 3.5294 0.0109 
config config 57 204 3.5789 0.4800 13.4118 0.0108 
























cyberespionage cyberespionage 27 203 7.5185 0.4776 6.3529 0.0108 
ftp FTP 55 203 3.6909 0.4776 12.9412 0.0108 
ic ICS 25 202 8.0800 0.4753 5.8824 0.0107 
endpoint endpoint 62 201 3.2419 0.4729 14.5882 0.0106 
solutions Solutions 30 201 6.7000 0.4729 7.0588 0.0106 
usb USB 62 201 3.2419 0.4729 14.5882 0.0106 
6e 6e 24 199 8.2917 0.4682 5.6471 0.0105 
currentcontrolset CurrentControlSet 46 199 4.3261 0.4682 10.8235 0.0105 
ge Ge 8 199 24.8750 0.4682 1.8824 0.0105 
j J 49 199 4.0612 0.4682 11.5294 0.0105 
usage usage 99 199 2.0101 0.4682 23.2941 0.0105 
beacon beacon 62 198 3.1935 0.4659 14.5882 0.0105 
cmd.exe cmd.exe 59 198 3.3559 0.4659 13.8824 0.0105 
upload uploaded 95 198 2.0842 0.4659 22.3529 0.0105 
xfish xfish 1 197 197.0000 0.4635 0.2353 0.0104 
32-bit 32-bit 64 196 3.0625 0.4612 15.0588 0.0104 
older older 91 193 2.1209 0.4541 21.4118 0.0102 
operational operational 96 193 2.0104 0.4541 22.5882 0.0102 
apt28 APT28 10 191 19.1000 0.4494 2.3529 0.0101 
hkcu HKCU 69 191 2.7681 0.4494 16.2353 0.0101 
static static 81 189 2.3333 0.4447 19.0588 0.0100 
android Android 39 188 4.8205 0.4424 9.1765 0.0100 
cybercriminal cybercriminals 48 188 3.9167 0.4424 11.2941 0.0100 
svchost.exe svchost.exe 71 188 2.6479 0.4424 16.7059 0.0100 
warfare warfare 33 188 5.6970 0.4424 7.7647 0.0100 
interestingly Interestingly 108 187 1.7315 0.4400 25.4118 0.0099 
mandiant Mandiant 23 187 8.1304 0.4400 5.4118 0.0099 
myanmar Myanmar 22 187 8.5000 0.4400 5.1765 0.0099 
whois whois 60 187 3.1167 0.4400 14.1176 0.0099 
























ghostnet GhostNet 17 185 10.8824 0.4353 4.0000 0.0098 
anti-virus anti-virus 64 184 2.8750 0.4329 15.0588 0.0097 
georgia Georgia 22 183 8.3182 0.4306 5.1765 0.0097 
callback callback 48 182 3.7917 0.4282 11.2941 0.0096 
monitoring monitoring 89 182 2.0449 0.4282 20.9412 0.0096 
mozilla/4 Mozilla/4 62 182 2.9355 0.4282 14.5882 0.0096 
obfuscation obfuscation 87 182 2.0920 0.4282 20.4706 0.0096 
redacted Redacted 37 182 4.9189 0.4282 8.7059 0.0096 
ae AES 29 181 6.2414 0.4259 6.8235 0.0096 
chopper Chopper 7 179 25.5714 0.4212 1.6471 0.0095 
query query 73 179 2.4521 0.4212 17.1765 0.0095 
removable Removable 44 179 4.0682 0.4212 10.3529 0.0095 
vector vectors 69 179 2.5942 0.4212 16.2353 0.0095 
luxembourg Luxembourg 14 178 12.7143 0.4188 3.2941 0.0094 
ssl SSL 60 178 2.9667 0.4188 14.1176 0.0094 
2e 2e 23 177 7.6957 0.4165 5.4118 0.0094 
exfiltration exfiltration 75 177 2.3600 0.4165 17.6471 0.0094 
tg-3390 TG-3390 2 177 88.5000 0.4165 0.4706 0.0094 
™ ™ 58 177 3.0517 0.4165 13.6471 0.0094 
compress compressed 75 176 2.3467 0.4141 17.6471 0.0093 
txt txt 51 176 3.4510 0.4141 12.0000 0.0093 
circl CIRCL 6 175 29.1667 0.4118 1.4118 0.0093 
cryptography cryptography 28 175 6.2500 0.4118 6.5882 0.0093 
handler handler 30 175 5.8333 0.4118 7.0588 0.0093 
toolset toolset 43 175 4.0698 0.4118 10.1176 0.0093 
turla Turla 21 175 8.3333 0.4118 4.9412 0.0093 
backup backup 62 174 2.8065 0.4094 14.5882 0.0092 
notable notable 70 173 2.4714 0.4071 16.4706 0.0092 
alert alert 68 172 2.5294 0.4047 16.0000 0.0091 
























c7 C7 20 172 8.6000 0.4047 4.7059 0.0091 
earliest earliest 58 172 2.9655 0.4047 13.6471 0.0091 
javascript Javascript 52 172 3.3077 0.4047 12.2353 0.0091 
serial Serial 75 172 2.2933 0.4047 17.6471 0.0091 
incorporated Incorporated 29 171 5.8966 0.4024 6.8235 0.0091 
mz MZ 31 170 5.4839 0.4000 7.2941 0.0090 
ponmocup Ponmocup 1 170 170.0000 0.4000 0.2353 0.0090 
delete deletes 78 169 2.1667 0.3976 18.3529 0.0090 
edx edx 19 169 8.8947 0.3976 4.4706 0.0090 
greenfor GreenFor 3 169 56.3333 0.3976 0.7059 0.0090 
operations Operations 48 169 3.5208 0.3976 11.2941 0.0090 
socket socket 49 169 3.4490 0.3976 11.5294 0.0090 
www.fireeye.com www.fireeye.com 17 169 9.9412 0.3976 4.0000 0.0090 
aspx aspx 40 168 4.2000 0.3953 9.4118 0.0089 
delete deleted 75 168 2.2400 0.3953 17.6471 0.0089 
iranian Iranian 30 168 5.6000 0.3953 7.0588 0.0089 
admin admin 52 167 3.2115 0.3929 12.2353 0.0088 
cn CN 43 167 3.8837 0.3929 10.1176 0.0088 
embed Embedded 100 167 1.6700 0.3929 23.5294 0.0088 
finfisher FinFisher 8 167 20.8750 0.3929 1.8824 0.0088 
pivy PIVY 6 167 27.8333 0.3929 1.4118 0.0088 
scanning scanning 69 167 2.4203 0.3929 16.2353 0.0088 
5a 5A 20 166 8.3000 0.3906 4.7059 0.0088 
hacker hacker 58 166 2.8621 0.3906 13.6471 0.0088 
ddo DDoS 38 165 4.3421 0.3882 8.9412 0.0087 
executable executables 82 165 2.0122 0.3882 19.2941 0.0087 
phish phishing 70 165 2.3571 0.3882 16.4706 0.0087 
fakem FakeM 6 164 27.3333 0.3859 1.4118 0.0087 
hangover Hangover 7 164 23.4286 0.3859 1.6471 0.0087 
























4d 4d 29 163 5.6207 0.3835 6.8235 0.0086 
m ms 43 163 3.7907 0.3835 10.1176 0.0086 
extract extracted 100 162 1.6200 0.3812 23.5294 0.0086 
jindiqiao@hotmail.com JinDiQIAO@hotmail.com 1 162 162.0000 0.3812 0.2353 0.0086 
shimrat ShimRat 1 162 162.0000 0.3812 0.2353 0.0086 
dec dec 53 161 3.0377 0.3788 12.4706 0.0085 
embassy embassy 31 161 5.1935 0.3788 7.2941 0.0085 
arbor Arbor 17 160 9.4118 0.3765 4.0000 0.0085 
zip zip 68 160 2.3529 0.3765 16.0000 0.0085 
adversary adversaries 47 159 3.3830 0.3741 11.0588 0.0084 
winnti Winnti 5 159 31.8000 0.3741 1.1765 0.0084 
content-type Content-Type 37 158 4.2703 0.3718 8.7059 0.0084 
longer longer 104 158 1.5192 0.3718 24.4706 0.0084 
a1 a1 32 157 4.9063 0.3694 7.5294 0.0083 
obfuscate obfuscated 84 157 1.8690 0.3694 19.7647 0.0083 
sandbox sandbox 54 157 2.9074 0.3694 12.7059 0.0083 
tools Tools 37 157 4.2432 0.3694 8.7059 0.0083 
extract extract 91 156 1.7143 0.3671 21.4118 0.0083 
cyberattack cyberattack 22 155 7.0455 0.3647 5.1765 0.0082 
feb FEB 42 155 3.6905 0.3647 9.8824 0.0082 
larger larger 94 155 1.6489 0.3647 22.1176 0.0082 
www.fidelissecurity.com 
WWW.FIDELISSECURITY.C
OM 8 155 19.3750 0.3647 1.8824 0.0082 
crysys CrySyS 9 154 17.1111 0.3624 2.1176 0.0082 
europe europe 78 154 1.9744 0.3624 18.3529 0.0082 
kitten Kitten 12 154 12.8333 0.3624 2.8235 0.0082 
directory directories 77 153 1.9870 0.3600 18.1176 0.0081 
po PoS 19 153 8.0526 0.3600 4.4706 0.0081 
sql SQL 50 153 3.0600 0.3600 11.7647 0.0081 
























troy Troy 7 153 21.8571 0.3600 1.6471 0.0081 
pdb PDB 40 152 3.8000 0.3576 9.4118 0.0081 
decode decoded 83 151 1.8193 0.3553 19.5294 0.0080 
sophistication sophistication 62 151 2.4355 0.3553 14.5882 0.0080 
command-and-control Command-and-control 81 150 1.8519 0.3529 19.0588 0.0079 
germany GeRMANy 72 150 2.0833 0.3529 16.9412 0.0079 
randomly randomly 66 150 2.2727 0.3529 15.5294 0.0079 
tech TECH 37 150 4.0541 0.3529 8.7059 0.0079 
unsigned unsigned 39 150 3.8462 0.3529 9.1765 0.0079 
db db 37 149 4.0270 0.3506 8.7059 0.0079 
indicators Indicators 89 148 1.6629 0.3482 20.9412 0.0078 
institute institute 52 148 2.8462 0.3482 12.2353 0.0078 
mac MAC 62 148 2.3871 0.3482 14.5882 0.0078 
pitty PITTy 4 148 37.0000 0.3482 0.9412 0.0078 
seconds seconds 62 147 2.3710 0.3459 14.5882 0.0078 
worm Worm 39 147 3.7692 0.3459 9.1765 0.0078 
0x00 0x00 18 146 8.1111 0.3435 4.2353 0.0077 
generic generic 74 146 1.9730 0.3435 17.4118 0.0077 
lnk lnk 34 146 4.2941 0.3435 8.0000 0.0077 
cve-2012-0158 CVE-2012-0158 59 145 2.4576 0.3412 13.8824 0.0077 
jan Jan 54 145 2.6852 0.3412 12.7059 0.0077 
ptr ptr 23 145 6.3043 0.3412 5.4118 0.0077 
rundll32.exe rundll32.exe 56 145 2.5893 0.3412 13.1765 0.0077 
underground underground 41 145 3.5366 0.3412 9.6471 0.0077 
xp XP 69 145 2.1014 0.3412 16.2353 0.0077 
7e 7E 13 144 11.0769 0.3388 3.0588 0.0076 
overlap overlap 68 144 2.1176 0.3388 16.0000 0.0076 
p. p. 22 144 6.5455 0.3388 5.1765 0.0076 
x509v3 X509v3 3 144 48.0000 0.3388 0.7059 0.0076 
























c++ C++ 53 143 2.6981 0.3365 12.4706 0.0076 
emissary eMISSARy 5 143 28.6000 0.3365 1.1765 0.0076 
exposureindicating Exposureindicating 1 143 143.0000 0.3365 0.2353 0.0076 
handshake handshake 24 143 5.9583 0.3365 5.6471 0.0076 
labs Labs 59 142 2.4068 0.3341 13.8824 0.0075 
www.threatgeek.com www.threatgeek.com 7 142 20.2857 0.3341 1.6471 0.0075 
lure Lure 56 141 2.5179 0.3318 13.1765 0.0075 
means means 79 141 1.7848 0.3318 18.5882 0.0075 
dukes Dukes 4 140 35.0000 0.3294 0.9412 0.0074 
affairs Affairs 45 139 3.0889 0.3271 10.5882 0.0074 
ch Ch 20 139 6.9500 0.3271 4.7059 0.0074 
ltd. Ltd 31 139 4.4839 0.3271 7.2941 0.0074 
georgian Georgian 9 138 15.3333 0.3247 2.1176 0.0073 
newer newer 81 138 1.7037 0.3247 19.0588 0.0073 
nov Nov 43 138 3.2093 0.3247 10.1176 0.0073 
beijing Beijing 36 137 3.8056 0.3224 8.4706 0.0073 
cve CVE 56 137 2.4464 0.3224 13.1765 0.0073 
encrypt Encrypt 78 137 1.7564 0.3224 18.3529 0.0073 
filename filenames 81 137 1.6914 0.3224 19.0588 0.0073 
terracotta TERRACOTTA 1 137 137.0000 0.3224 0.2353 0.0073 
tibet TIBeT 21 137 6.5238 0.3224 4.9412 0.0073 
timestamp timestamps 48 137 2.8542 0.3224 11.2941 0.0073 
www.crysys.hu www.crysys.hu 3 137 45.6667 0.3224 0.7059 0.0073 
ee ee 25 136 5.4400 0.3200 5.8824 0.0072 
fox-it fox-it 3 136 45.3333 0.3200 0.7059 0.0072 





APPENDIX C. SAMPLE OF THE ONTOLOGY 
This section contains a partial sample of the ontology in RDF/OWL format. The 





     
xml:base="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/onto
logies/apt" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-
ns#" 
     xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xmlns:xml="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"> 




    <!--  
    
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////////// 
    // 
    // Data properties 
    // 
    
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////////// 
     --> 
 
 








    <!--  







    // 
    // Classes 
    // 
    
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////////// 
     --> 
 
 












    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#APT"> 
        <owl:disjointWith 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Protocol"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">An advanced persistent 
threat (APT) is the name given to a network attack in which 
an unauthorized organization, also identified as an APT, 
gains access to a network and stays there undetected for a 
long period of time in order to execute a complex 
attack.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#APT_Attack"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>An advanced persistent threat (APT) 





access to a network and stays there undetected for a long 
period of time. The intention of an APT attack is to steal 
data rather than to cause damage to the network or 
organization.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#APT_Organization"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT"/> 
        <rdfs:comment></rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Actions_on_Objective_Phase"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Phases"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">During this phase the 
APT is actively going after the data that they originally 
identified as their target (Hutchins et al., 2011). The APT 
uses previously installed software to determine the network 
layout including, but not limited to, mapping the hosts of 
networked drives, database servers, domain controllers, 
PKI, etc. (Ask et al., 2013). The goal here is to footprint 
the network and to establish a network account and elevate 
the privileges for that account (Ask et al., 2013). During 
this phase, the APT will also seek to compromise more hosts 
in order to strengthen its foothold in the target network. 
The extraction of the target data may also be accomplished 
using custom encryption and/or tunneling within other 
protocols to hide the data from security professionals 
(Websense, 2011).</rdfs:comment> 










    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Administrators"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Those who manage or administer 
networks and servers.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Affiliates"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Anti-Forensics"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Hardening_Techniques"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Anti-forensic techniques try to 
frustrate forensic investigators and their techniques to 
analyze and understand malware. This can include refusing 
to run when debugging mode is enabled, refusing to run when 
running inside of a virtual machine, or deliberately 
overwriting data.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Anti-Malware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Anti-Spyware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Antivirus"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Backdoor"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 










    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Bank_Accounts"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Individuals"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#BotNet_Managers"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Botnet"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>a network of private computers 
infected with malicious software and controlled as a group 
without the owners&apos; knowledge, e.g., to send spam 
messages.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Command-and-Control"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The centralized computer that issues 
commands to a botnet (zombie army) and receives reports 
back from the coopted computers.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#C2_Server"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Command-and-Control"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The centralized computer that issues 
commands to a botnet (zombie army) and receives reports 
back from the coopted computers.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#CA"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Certification_Authority"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Legitimate_Applications"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>In cryptography, a certificate 
authority or certification authority (CA) is an entity that 
issues digital certificates. A digital certificate 
certifies the ownership of a public key by the named 





    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#CNC"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Command-and-Control"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Certificate_Authority"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Certification_Authority"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Legitimate_Applications"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>In cryptography, a certificate 
authority or certification authority (CA) is an entity that 
issues digital certificates. A digital certificate 
certifies the ownership of a public key by the named 
subject of the certificate.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Certification_Authority"> 







        <rdfs:comment>In cryptography, a certificate 
authority or certification authority (CA) is an entity that 
issues digital certificates. A digital certificate 
certifies the ownership of a public key by the named 
subject of the certificate.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Command-and-Control"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#C&amp;C"/> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#C&amp;C_Server"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The centralized computer that issues 
commands to a botnet (zombie army) and receives reports 
back from the coopted computers.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Command_and_Control_Phase"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Phases"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">The Command and Control 
phase begins once the infected host beacons the C2 server 
(Hutchins et al., 2011). Attackers need to maintain access 
to the victim’s network means that each communication with 
a compromised system (Auty, 2015). During this phase the 
APT will seek to obtain elevated privileges on the system 
and will install additional software to facilitate the 
attack (i.e., encryption) on compromised system and network 





achieved by software designed to exploit a zero-day 
vulnerability, the additional software is likely to be 
commonly known software that may even be approved to 
operate on the network for legitimate activities (e.g., 
SSH, SecureFTP, etc.) (Ask et al., 2013).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>CVE is a list of information security 
vulnerabilities and exposures that aims to provide common 
names for publicly known cyber security issues. The goal of 
CVE is to make it easier to share data across separate 
vulnerability capabilities (tools, repositories, and 
services) with this &quot;common 
enumeration.&quot;</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Communication_Pathway"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Communications"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Components"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Components"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Attack"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Compression_Algorithm"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Compression is a reduction in the 
number of bits needed to represent data. Compressing data 
can save storage capacity, speed file transfer, and 
decrease costs for storage hardware and network 
bandwidth.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Compression_Program"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>An application which employs one or 
more Compression Algorithms for the purpose of compressing 





    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Credit_Cards"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Individuals"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Criminal_Services"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#DDoS_Attackers"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Responsible for managing the DDoS 
attacks that are part of the APT Campaign.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Personnel who filter through data 
looking for the information that has value.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Database_Server"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Service"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Database server is the term used to 
refer to the back-end system of a database application 
using client/server architecture. The back-end, sometimes 
called a database server, performs tasks such as data 
analysis, storage, data manipulation, archiving, and other 
non-user specific tasks.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Defensive_Counter_Measures"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Steps taken by APT Organizations to 
reduce the chance of detection</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Defined_Path"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Delivery_Phase"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Phases"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">In the Delivery phase, 
the APT transmits the weapon to the targeted system 
(Hutchins et al., 2011). Lockheed Martin identifies the 
most common delivery methods as email attachments, websites 
and removable media. In addition to those three, Ask, 
et.al. (Ask et al., 2013) identified social media as 
another means for launching at attack against an individual 
within the target organization. For the attack to move 
beyond this phase, the targeted individual most click on 
the link, attachment, or application for the attack to move 
into the next phase (Auty, 2015).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Domain_Name_Server"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Service"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Domain Name Servers (DNS) are the 
Internet&apos;s equivalent of a phone book. They maintain a 
directory of domain names and translate them to Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses. This is necessary because, 
although domain names are easy for people to remember, 
computers or machines, access websites based on IP 
addresses.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Downloader"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>An application that will download and 
install other Trojans onto your computer.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Encryption_Algorithm"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>What we all call Triple DES is EDE 
(encrypt, decrypt, encrypt). The way that it works is that 
you take three 56-bit keys, and encrypt with K1, decrypt 
with K2 and encrypt with K3. There are two-key and three-
key versions. Think of the two-key version as merely one 
where K1=K3. Note that if K1=K2=K3, then Triple DES is 
really Single DES.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Encryption_Program"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Programs designed to encrypt data at 
rest (DAR) on a local machine or server.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Exploitation_Phase"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Phases"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Exploitation involves 
compromising the host machine on the network. It is where 
the weaponized tool is triggered (Hutchins et al., 2011). 
The exploitation can be of a flaw in the operating system 
or an individual application on the host (Ask et al., 2013; 
Hutchins et al., 2011).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#FTP"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#File_Transfer_Protocol"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#TCP"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Converts stolen data into 
money</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#File_Transfer_Protocol"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Transmission_Control_Protocol"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Firewall"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#For_Profit_Organization"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Forensics_Tools"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Funding"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Organization"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Sources of funding for conducting 
criminal or espionage activities.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Government_Agency_or_Department"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#HTTP"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#HyperText_Transfer_Protocol"/> 







    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#HTTPS"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Secure_HyperText_Transfer_Protocol"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#TCP"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Hardening_Techniques"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>hardening is usually the process of 
securing a system or program by reducing its surface of 
vulnerability, which is larger when a system performs more 
functions</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#HyperText_Transfer_Protocol"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Transmission_Control_Protocol"/> 










    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#ICS"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Incident_Command_System"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Software"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The Incident Command System (ICS) is 
a standardized approach to the command, control, and 
coordination of emergency response[1] providing a common 
hierarchy within which responders from multiple agencies 
can be effective.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#IOC"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>IOC (indicator of compromise) – a 
list of threat data (e.g., strings defining file paths or 
registry keys) which can be used to detect a threat in the 
infrastructure using automated software-based 
analysis.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Impersonated_Software"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Malicious software with a name 
matching legitimate software on a computer.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Incident_Command_System"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Software"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The Incident Command System (ICS) is 
a standardized approach to the command, control, and 
coordination of emergency response[1] providing a common 
hierarchy within which responders from multiple agencies 
can be effective.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"> 







        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">IOC (indicator of 
compromise) – a list of threat data (e.g., strings defining 
file paths or registry keys) which can be used to detect a 
threat in the infrastructure using automated software-based 
analysis.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Injection"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Injection_File"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Injection_File"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>This appears to be a legitimate 
document in one of many common file formats (DOC, PPT, XLS, 
PDF, etc.) which contains a payload of malicious code. When 
the document is opened the code is executed and the host 
computer is infected.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Phases"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The next phase of the attack is the 
Installation phase. Installation refers to the installation 
of a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) or backdoor that the 
APT can use to gain control of the target’s computer (Ask 
et al., 2013; Hutchins et al., 2011). Once the victim 
triggers the malicious code (e.g. by clicking the malicious 
link, opening the infected file, or visiting the 
compromised site, etc.) the code reaches back to its 
Command and Control (C2) server and provides the attacker 
with useful information about the target network’s 
environment that could be useful in executing the later 
stages of the APT attack (Ask et al., 2013). Once installed 
the RAT can also lay dormant until the C2 server connects 
to it (Ask et al., 2013; Sikorski &amp; Honig, 
2012).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Installer"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A self-extracting, 
self-installing file that delivers a payload of malicious 
software to an unsuspecting user&apos;s 
computer.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Installers"> 







        <rdfs:comment>Software designed to build installing 
applications for other programs.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Intrusion_Detection_System"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a 
type of security management system for computers and 
networks. An IDS gathers and analyzes information from 
various areas within a computer or a network to identify 
possible security breaches, which include both intrusions 
(attacks from outside the organization) and misuse (attacks 
from within the organization).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Intrusion_Prevention_System"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) 
is a network security/threat prevention technology that 
examines network traffic flows to detect and prevent 
vulnerability exploits.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>A keylogger is a type of surveillance 
software (considered to be either software or spyware) that 
has the capability to record every keystroke you make to a 
log file, usually encrypted. A keylogger recorder can 
record instant messages, e-mail, and any information you 
type at any time using your keyboard.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Legitimate_Applications"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>These are applications that are 
developed for legimate and legal purposes.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Legitimate_Business_Partners"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Logic_Bomb"> 







        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A logic bomb is 
malicious code embedded within an application that executes 
based on certain events. The logic bomb lies dormant until 
that event occurs.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#MD5_Hash"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#MUTEX"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#MaaS"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware_as_a_Service"/> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#TaaS"/> 







        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Mail_Server"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Service"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>A mail server (also known as a mail 
transfer agent or MTA, a mail transport agent, a mail 
router or an Internet mailer) is an application that 
receives incoming e-mail from local users (people within 
the same domain) and remote senders and forwards outgoing 
e-mail for delivery.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Malicious_Domain"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Domains which are registered and 
maintained to conduct malicious operations. Usually used to 
impersonate legitimate sites but which are designed to 
distribute malicious programs to unsuspecting 
victims.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Malicious_IP"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Malware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Components"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Malware refers to any 
type of malicious software that tries to infect a computer 
or mobile device.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Malware_Analysis"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Malware_Packers"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Malware_Testers"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Malware_as_a_Service"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#TaaS"/> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Trojan_as_a_Service"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Cybercriminals are increasingly 
offering malware as a cloud-based on-demand service. ... 
Rather than turning a profit just once by selling a 
security exploit as a one-off, authors of malicious 
software are now selling malware as a cloud-based 
service.</rdfs:comment> 










    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Manager"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Runs the APT Organization and 
develops its infrastructure</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Metamorphic"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Polymorphic"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>This type of malware is constructed 
in such a manner that is can re-engineer or recode itself 
(Raj et al., 2014; Sikorski &amp; Honig, 2012). This 
recoding can take place each time it propagates or is 
distributed through a network. This type of malware hinders 
the use of signature-based protection tools (Raj et al., 
2014).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Money_Flow_Managers"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 










    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Motivation"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Organization"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The Organization&apos;s motivation 
for conducting their APT attacks.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Mules"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#NFP"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Not_for_Profit"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#NGO"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Non-Government_Organization"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Non-Government_Organization"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Not_for_Profit"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#OS_Component"> 







        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Operating_System"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#OS_Tool"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Operating_System_Tool"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Operating_System"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Obfuscation"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Hardening_Techniques"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Obfuscation and its subset, packing, 
are techniques used by malware developers to make static 
analysis more difficult for the forensics experts (Brand et 
al., 2010; Sikorski &amp; Honig, 2012). Obfuscation is a 
means of hiding or disguising code (Sikorski &amp; Honig, 
2012).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Real-time_Encryption"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Legitimate_Applications"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>On-the-fly encryption (OTFE), also 
known as real-time encryption and transparent encryption, 
is a method used by some disk encryption software. ... In 
general, every method in which data is transparently 
encrypted on write and decrypted on read can be called on-
the-fly encryption.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Operating_System"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Software"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Operating_System_Component"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Operating_System"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Operating_System"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#POSMalware"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Point_of_Sale_Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Packing"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Hardening_Techniques"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Obfuscation and its subset, packing, 
are techniques used by malware developers to make static 
analysis more difficult for the forensics experts (Brand et 
al., 2010; Sikorski &amp; Honig, 2012). Obfuscation is a 
means of hiding or disguising code (Sikorski &amp; Honig, 
2012). Packing uses compression and a wrapping program as a 
means of disguising the true purpose of program (Sikorski 
&amp; Honig, 2012). Even more challenging for analysts and 
malware detection is recursive packaging which obfuscates 
code in multiple layers of recursive compression (Egele et 
al., 2012).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Password_Recovery"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Legitimate_Applications"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Password Recovery Software to help 
recover lost and forgotten passwords</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Personally_Identifiable_Information"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Individuals"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) is data that can be used to impersonate 
someone or used to steal their identity and commit 
fraudulent acts while pretending to be that 
person.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Personnel"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Organization"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>The different skillsets of 
individuals working for the group.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Phases"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Attack"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Phishing"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>the activity of defrauding an online 
account holder of financial information by posing as a 
legitimate company.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Point_of_Sale_Malware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A Point of Sale Malware 
(POSMalware) is designed to attack and exploit POS 
systems.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>This type of malware is constructed 
in such a manner that is can re-engineer or recode itself 
(Raj et al., 2014; Sikorski &amp; Honig, 2012). This 
recoding can take place each time it propagates or is 
distributed through a network. This type of malware hinders 
the use of signature-based protection tools (Raj et al., 
2014).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Programmers"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Programming_Language"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Software"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Protectors"> 







        <rdfs:comment>Obfuscation and its subset, packing, 
are techniques used by malware developers to make static 
analysis more difficult for the forensics experts (Brand et 
al., 2010; Sikorski &amp; Honig, 2012). Packing uses 
compression and a wrapping program as a means of disguising 
the true purpose of program (Sikorski &amp; Honig, 2012). 
Even more challenging for analysts and malware detection is 
recursive packaging which obfuscates code in multiple 
layers of recursive compression (Egele et al., 
2012).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Protocol"> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A protocol defines 
rules and conventions for communication between network 
devices.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Ransomware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Ransomware holds a 
user’s data hostage. The latest ransomware variants encrypt 
the user’s data, thus making it unusable until a ransom is 
paid to retrieve the decryption key.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Legitimate_Applications"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>On-the-fly encryption (OTFE), also 
known as real-time encryption and transparent encryption, 
is a method used by some disk encryption software. ... In 
general, every method in which data is transparently 
encrypted on write and decrypted on read can be called on-
the-fly encryption.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Reconnaissance_Phase"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Phases"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Reconnaissance is the 
selection and identification of the desired target. In this 
stage the APT is footprinting the target organization and 
collecting information including but not limited to names, 
positions, email addresses, physical locations, operating 
systems, etc. (Hutchins et al., 2011). Through this 
information gathering process the APT determines who has 
ownership of the desired information that they seek to 
steal (2013). The APT will determine which employee to 
compromise as well as a potential means for doing 
so.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Recruiters"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Find individuals with the talents 
need to complete a specific task or develop a specific 





    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Recursive_Packaging"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Hardening_Techniques"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Obfuscation and its subset, packing, 
are techniques used by malware developers to make static 
analysis more difficult for the forensics experts (Brand et 
al., 2010; Sikorski &amp; Honig, 2012). Obfuscation is a 
means of hiding or disguising code (Sikorski &amp; Honig, 
2012). Packing uses compression and a wrapping program as a 
means of disguising the true purpose of program (Sikorski 
&amp; Honig, 2012). Even more challenging for analysts and 
malware detection is recursive packaging which obfuscates 
code in multiple layers of recursive compression (Egele et 
al., 2012).</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Registry_Key"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Remote_Access_Toolkit"> 







        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Remote_Administration_Toolkit"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Remote_Access_Trojan"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Remote_Administration_Toolkit"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Remote_Administration_Toolkit"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Rootkit"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A rootkit is the 





without being detected. Your antivirus application 
communicates with your operating system to identify 
threats. However, rootkits breaks down this communication 
process.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#SFTP"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Secure_File_Transfer_Protocol"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#TCP"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#SHA1_Hash"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#SHA256_Hash"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 










    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#SSH"> 
        <owl:equivalentClass 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Secure_Shell_Protocol"/> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#TCP"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Secure_File_Transfer_Protocol"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Transmission_Control_Protocol"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Secure_HyperText_Transfer_Protocol"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Transmission_Control_Protocol"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 











        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Transmission_Control_Protocol"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Security_Firm"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Attack"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Tools and techniques 
that cybersecurity professionals can use to protect 
networks and systems against various hacking attacks 
including elements of APT Attacks.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Security_as_a_Service"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Security_and_Protective_Measures"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Security-as-a-service 
(SaaS) is an outsourcing model for security management. 
Typically, Security as a Service involves applications such 





term can also refer to security management provided in-
house by an external organization.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Service"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Target_Software"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Service_Renters"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>A person who acts on the 
organization&apos;s behalf to secure 
services.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Signed_Certificate"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Indicators_of_Compromise"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Social_Engineering"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Techniques_and_Tools"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Social engineering is an attack 
vector that relies heavily on human interaction and often 
involves tricking people into breaking normal security 
procedures.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Social_Engineers"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Individuals who specialize in 
conducting social engineering campaigns</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Spam_Distributors"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Personnel"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Personnel who distribute spam 
messages to targeted individuals or groups of 
individuals.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 








    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Spearphishing"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Phishing"/> 
        <rdfs:comment>Spear phishing is an email that 
appears to be from an individual or business that you know. 
But it isn&apos;t. It&apos;s from the same criminal hackers 
who want your credit card and bank account numbers, 
passwords, and the financial information on your 
PC.</rdfs:comment> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Sponsor_State"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#APT_Organization"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 




    <owl:Class 
rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/ont
ologies/apt#Spyware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/coreythomasholzer/
ontologies/apt#Malware"/> 
        <rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Spyware is installed on 
a machine without the user’s awareness or consent. Spyware 
attempts to gather specific user information and send it to 
a third party.</rdfs:comment> 
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